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Literature
Rylands v Fletcher (1868) Law Reports (LR) 3 House of Lords (HL) 330.
See, especially, O.W. Holmes, The Common Law (1881), 116–7; F. Pollock, Duties of Insuring Safety: The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (1886) 2 Law Quarterly Review (LQR) 52; F.H. Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands v Fletcher (1911) 59 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (U Pa L Rev) 298, 373 and 423; E.R. Thayer, Liability without Fault (1916) 29 Harvard Law Review (Harv L Rev) 801; P.H. Winfield, Nuisance as a Tort (1931) 4 Cambridge Law Journal (CLJ) 189; F.V. Harper, Liability Without Fault and Proximate Cause (1932) 30 Michigan Law Review (Mich L Rev) 1001; W.L. Prosser, Nuisance without Fault (1942) 20 Texas Law Review (Tex L Rev) 399; C. Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity (1952) 61 Yale Law Journal (Yale LJ) 1172; and P. Keeton, Trespass, Nuisance, and Strict Liability (1959) 59 Columbia Law Review (Colum L Rev) 457.
See C. Dalton, Losing History: Tort Liability in the Nineteenth Century and the Case of Rylands v Fletcher (unpublished typescript dated 1987); A.W.B. Simpson, Bursting Reservoirs and Victorian Tort Law: Rylands and Horrocks v. Fletcher (1868), in: Leading Cases in the Common Law (1995); G.T. Schwartz, Rylands v Fletcher, Negligence and Strict Liability, in: P. Cane/J. Stapleton (eds.), Essays in Celebration of John Fleming (1998); K. Stanton, The Legacy of Rylands v Fletcher, in: N.J. Mullany/A.M. Linden (eds.), Torts Tomorrow: A Tribute to John Fleming (1998); J. Murphy, The Merits of Rylands v Fletcher (2004) 24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (OJLS) 643; and D. Nolan, The Distinctiveness of Rylands v Fletcher (2005) 120 LQR 421.
F. H. Bohlen (supra fn. 2), 298.
See, e.g., C.A. Wright, The Adequacy of the Law of Torts [1961] CLJ 44, 52 (“a storm centre”).
On the forms of action and the writ system, see J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (4th edn. 2002), ch. 4.
The classic accounts include: F. James, Contribution among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism (1941) 54 Harv L Rev 1156; W.G. Friedmann, Social Insurance and the Principles of Tort Liability (1949) 63 Harv L Rev 241; A.A. Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault: Trends toward an Enterprise Liability for Insurable Loss (1951); C.O. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability (1951) 37 Virginia Law Review (Va L Rev) 359; R.E. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts (1959) 72 Harv L Rev 401; G. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts (1961) 70 Yale LJ 499; and J.G. Fleming, The Role of Negligence in Modern Tort Law (1967) 53 Va L Rev 815, especially 837–40. Important recent contributions include: G.L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law (1985) 14 Journal of Legal Studies (J Leg Stud) 461; V.E. Nolan/E. Ursin, Understanding Enterprise Liability: Rethinking Tort Reform for the Twenty-first Century (1995); R.L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise Liability (1996) 55 Maryland Law Review (Md L Rev) 1190; and G.C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict Liability (2001) 54 Vanderbilt Law Review (Vand L Rev) 1285. See also American Law Institute, Reporters’ Study on Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury (1991). Much of the literature has focussed on product liability, but that is too big a topic to address here.
A. A. Ehrenzweig (supra fn. 7). Cf. R.E. Keeton’s concept of “conditional fault” (supra fn. 7).
See, e.g., J.G. Fleming (supra fn. 7), 839.
G. C. Keating (supra fn. 7), 1286 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., C.O. Gregory (supra fn. 7), 383, G. Calabresi (supra fn. 7), 500.
C. O. Gregory (supra fn. 7), 383.
A. A. Ehrenzweig (supra fn. 7), 53–4.
C. O. Gregory (supra fn. 7), 383.
J. G. Fleming (supra fn. 7), 822.
See, especially, G.P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory (1972) 65 Harv L Rev 537; K.N. Hylton, The Theory of Tort Doctrine and the Restatement (Third) of Torts (2001) 54 Vand L Rev 1413, 1433–6.
See, e.g., F. James (supra fn. 7), 1156–7; R. Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines (1914) 27 Harv L Rev 195, 233.
G. Calabresi/ A.D. Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral (1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089. This does not preclude the prohibition, whether by injunction or regulation, of activities that present an unreasonable risk of danger, but this is not enterprise liability but an application of the normal fault principle. See R.E. Keeton (supra fn. 7), 427–8.
A. A. Ehrenzweig (supra fn. 7), 52–4; W.L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer) (1960) 69 Yale LJ 1099, 1143–46. G. Calabresi (supra fn. 7), 529 finds that liability for unforeseeable losses, though inconsistent with the loss-spreading justification for enterprise, is required by the resource-allocation justification that he prefers.
See, e.g., G. Calabresi (supra fn. 7), 500–01; G.L. Priest (supra fn. 7), 466.
F. James (supra fn. 7), 1156. See further R.E. Keeton (supra fn. 7), 405–7; A. Tunc, International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, vol XI, Torts (1983), paras. 1.168–171; W.P. Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts (5th edn. 1984), 24–5; P. Cane, Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law (6th edn. 1999), 353–6.
In fact, it is hard to find unequivocal support for the pure loss-shifting thesis, but cf. R. Pound (supra fn. 16), 233: “There is a strong and growing tendency, where there is no blame on either side, to ask, in view of the exigencies of social justice who can best bear the loss, and hence to shift the loss by creating liability where there has been no fault.” L.W. Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain Types of Tort Cases (1930) 78 U Pa L Rev 805 and (1931) 79 U Pa L Rev 742 is sometimes cited as a proponent, but it is in fact clear that he regarded loss-shifting only as a means of loss-distribution. However, G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (1970), 40–2 offers a partial defence of the “deep pockets” approach, arguing that it can be combined with loss-spreading to reduce secondary accident costs further than is possible by pure loss-spreading. (This passage may be compared with G. Calabresi (supra fn. 7), 527–8.)
C. O. Gregory (supra fn. 7), 383–4, G. Calabresi (supra fn. 7), 519–27.
G. Calabresi (supra fn. 7), 518. See further A.A. Ehrenzweig, Assurance Oblige — A Comparative Study (1950) 15 Law & Contemporary Problems 450.
Escola v Coca Cola Bottling Co of Fresno (1944) 150 Pacific Reporter. Second Series (P 2d) 436, 441, per Traynor J (considering strict liability for defective products). On Traynor’s influence, see further P. Keeton, Roger Traynor and the Law of Torts (1971) 44 Southern California Law Review 1045.
G. Calabresi (supra fn. 21), ch. 5.
See, especially, R.A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence (1972) 1 J Leg Stud 29.
The classic analysis is S. Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence (1980) 9 J Leg Stud 1 (concluding that strict liability is superior to negligence in this respect in the case of “unilateral” accidents where only injurer activity levels are relevant).
By G.L. Priest (supra fn. 7), 465. See F. James (supra fn. 7).
By J.B. Clutterbuck, Karl Llewellyn and the Intellectual Foundations of Enterprise Liability Theory (1988) 97 Yale LJ 1131.
By V. Nolan/ E. Ursin (supra fn. 7), 30 highlighting in particular Green’s two-part article, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases (1928) 28 Colum L Rev 1014 and (1929) 29 Colum L Rev 255 (see, e.g., 270: “The risks of physical harms could be distributed as well as could wages and other costs.”).
F. James, Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative Remedies (1952) 27 New York University Law Review (NYU L Rev) 537, 540n. It seems that Albert A. Ehrenzweig first used the term in his (anonymous) student note, Loss-Shifting and Quasi-Negligence: A New Interpretation of the Palsgraf case (1941) 8 University of Chicago Law Review (U Chi L Rev 72), 744. This usage was picked up later the same year by Charles O. Gregory in his review of W.L. Prosser’s Handbook of the Law of Torts in the same journal: (1941) 9 U Chi L Rev 196, 198.
K. Takayanagi, Liability Without Fault in the Modern Civil and Common Law — II (1921) 16 Illinois Law Review (Ill L Rev) 268, 270 and passim. From the 1920s onwards, a number of writers also began employing the term “entrepreneur theory” in connection with vicarious liability: see, e.g., W.O. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk (1929) 38 Yale LJ 584 and 720, and C. Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor (1934) 29 Ill L Rev 339.
R. Pound (supra fn. 16), 233. See also E.R. Thayer (supra fn. 2), 802–3 (who notes (803) that “ultimately, like any other overhead charge... [liability costs] would fall on the consumer”) and F.H. Bohlen (supra fn. 2), 431–2 and 441–6.
O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law (1897) 10 Harv L Rev 457, 467.
Ibid.
O. W. Holmes (supra fn. 2), 148.
See, e.g., for England, P. Bartrip/ S. Burman, The Wounded Soldiers of Industry: Industrial Compensation Policy, 1833–97 (1983) and, for the United States, J.F. Witt, The Transformation of Work and the Law of Workplace Accidents, 1842–1910 (1998) 107 Yale LJ 1467.
See, e.g., A.A. Ballantine, A Compensation Plan for Railway Accident Claims (1916) 29 Harv L Rev 705 (1916).
C. O. Gregory (supra fn. 7), 388. See also V.E. Nolan/E. Ursin (supra fn. 7), 21–9 and W.S. Malone, Damage Suits and the Contagious Principle of Workmen’s Compensation (1952) 12 Loyola Law Review (Loy L Rev) 231.
For a detailed account, using archival material as well as the reports, see A.W.B. Simpson (supra fn. 3).
Fletcher v Rylands (1875) 3 Hurlstone & Coltman’s Exchequer Reports (H&C) 774, 159 English Reports (ER) 737.
Fletcher v Rylands (1866) LR 1 Exchequer Cases (Exch) 265.
(1866) LR 1 Exch 265, 279–80.
Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330.
(1868) LR 3 HL 330, 339. It may be doubted whether Cairns in fact conceived of this as adding anything to Blackburn’s statement of principle: see F.H. Newark, Non-Natural User and Rylands v. Fletcher (1961) 24 Modern Law Review (MLR) 557. Further analysis of the non-natural user requirement may be found in W.T.S. Stallybrass, Dangerous Things and the Non-Natural User of Land (1929) 3 CLJ 376 and D.W. Williams, Non-Natural Use of Land [1973] CLJ 310.
See, e.g., Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 Appeal Cases (AC) 264, 299 per Lord Goff.
(1865) 3 H&C 774, 789.
Ibid.
(1865) 3 H&C 774, 790.
Ibid.
(1865) 3 H&C 774, 790–1.
(1865) 3 H&C 774, 792.
(1865) 3 H&C 774, 793.
(1865) 3 H&C 774, 794–5.
(1865) 3 H&C 774, 798.
Ibid.
Fletcher v Rylands (1866) LR 1 Exch 265, 278.
No. 7.
Fletcher v Rylands (1866) LR 1 Exch 265, 280.
P.H. Winfield (supra fn. 2), 194.
(1704) 2 Lord Raymond’s Reports (Ld Raym) 1089, 1 Salkeld’s King’s Bench Reports 21, 360. In fact, Salkeld (unlike Raymond) reports Chief Justice Holt as deciding on the basis of trespass.
See (1866) LR 1 Exch 265, 286 where he adopts the language of Salkeld’s report of the decision, saying “he whose stuff it is must keep it that it may not trespass”. The difficulty with this analysis is that the action was brought in case, not trespass. Cf. Lord Raymond’s report, which does not employ the term “trespass”. Most modern writers consider the case to be correctly regarded as one in private nuisance: see, e.g., R.F.V. Heuston/R.A. Buckley, Salmond & Heuston on the Law of Torts (21st edn. 1996), 53 and A. Dugdale (ed.), Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (18th edn. 2000), § 18-08. Cf. P.H. Winfield (supra fn. 2), 193 (“an innominate... [action] upon the case”).
(1866) LR 1 Exch 265, 280.
(1866) LR 1 Exch 265, 286–7.
(1866) LR 1 Exch 265, 287.
See R.F.V. Heuston, Who was the Third Lord in Rylands v Fletcher? (1970) 86 LQR 160.
Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330, 340.
(1868) LR 3 HL 330, 338.
(1868) LR 3 HL 330, 338.
Cf. Nichols v Marsland (1875) LR 10 Exch 255, 260 where he described Rylands v Fletcher as a case where “the defendant poured the water into the plaintiff’s mine” without actually using the term “trespass”. It appears that he preferred “pour” to “escape” because the latter misleadingly suggested that water was an active agent: Carstairs v Taylor (1871) LR 6 Exch 217, 221.
Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd [1947] AC 156, 182 per Lord Simonds. The former common law liability has now been abolished and replaced with a statutory claim under Animals Act 1971, sec. 4.
See, e.g., F.H. Bohlen (supra fn. 2), 311–3; J.G. Fleming, The Law of Torts (9th edn. 1998), 375. Cf. P. Keeton (supra fn. 2), 474 (not trespass because the invasion was unintentional). Most of the other leading texts do not even consider the possibility that trespass might be the basis of the cause of action.
F.H. Bohlen (supra fn. 2), 311.
The Boundaries of Nuisance (1949) 65 LQR 480.
[1994] 2 AC 264.
[2004] 2 AC 1.
F.H. Newark (supra fn. 77), 487–8, cited approvingly by Lord Goff at [1994] 2 AC 264, 298. See also Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 2 AC 1, 7 per Lord Bingham, and 15 and 17 per Lord Hoffmann. Dalton has disputed whether liability in nuisance for a single isolated escape really was novel: supra fn. 3, 148n.
As F.H. Bohlen too was prepared to accept: supra fn. 2, 431.
P.H. Winfield (supra fn. 2), 195–6. G.W. Paton, Liability for Nuisance (1942) 37 Ill L Rev 1, 3 and W.A. Seavey, Nuisance: Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries (1952) 65 Harv L Rev 984, 985–6 also endeavour to distinguish the two liabilities.
Private nuisance normally involves something emanating from the defendant’s land (Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] 655, 685 per Lord Goff) but this is not a necessary element of the tort: see, e.g., L.E. Jones (Insurance Brokers) Ltd v Portsmouth City Council [2003] 1 Weekly Law Reports (WLR) 427.
G. Williams/ B. Hepple, Foundations of the Law of Tort (2nd edn. 1984), 123–7. Cf. J. Murphy (supra fn. 3), 644–56.
Pride of Derby and Derbyshire Angling Association Ltd v British Celanese Ltd [1953] Law Reports, Chancery Division, 3rd Series (Ch) 149.
F.H. Bohlen (supra fn. 2), 431. Cf. W.L. Prosser (supra fn. 2), who viewed the liability for “absolute nuisance” under Rylands v Fletcher (420) as distinguishable from intentional and negligent nuisances. W.A. Seavey (supra fn. 82), however, uses “absolute nuisance” to refer to the intentional creation of a dangerous condition (991).
See, e.g., R.F.V. Heuston/ R.A. Buckley (supra fn. 62); W.V.H. Rogers, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (16th edn. 2002); J. Murphy, Street on Torts (11th edn. 2003). In Australia, J.G. Fleming (supra fn. 73) kept a separate chapter for Rylands v Fletcher even after the High Court declared the principle to have been absorbed by the ordinary law of negligence (Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 Commonwealth Law Reports (CLR) 520).
J. Murphy (supra fn. 3), 669; D. Nolan (supra fn. 3).
(1865) 3 H&C 774, 790.
(1868) LR 3 HL 330, 338.
[1913] AC 263, 275 per Lord Moulton.
See, e.g, Crowhurst v Amersham Burial Board (1878) 4 Exchequer Division (Ex D) 5, 11 per Kelly CB; Snow v Whitehead (1882) 27 Chancery Division, 2nd Series (Ch D) 588, 591 per Kay J; Musgrove v Pandelis [1919] 2 King’s Bench (KB) 43, 47 per Bankes LJ, 49 per Warrington LJ and 51 per Duke LJ.
(1704) 2 Ld Raym 1089, 1092.
(1866) LR l Exch 265, 283–5.
Ibid., 285. Cf. Lord Cairns’ distinction between natural and non-natural users: no. 16 above.
Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880, 903 per Lord Wright, criticised by D.R. Coquillette, Mosses From an Old Manse: Another Look at Some Historic Property Cases About the Environment (1979) 64 Cornell Law Review (Cornell L Rev) 761, 781 who argues that sic utere only came into play once it had been established that the plaintiff had suffered actionable damage, and was simply designed to prevent the defendant excusing himself on grounds of social utility.
S.R. Perry, The Impossibility of General Strict Liability (1988) 1 Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 147. See also P.H. Winfield, The Myth of Absolute Liability (1926) 42 LQR 37, 38. Cf. G. Calabresi (supra fn. 21), 64–7.
D. Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (1999), 106. For further analysis, see C. Dalton (supra fn. 3), 169–72.
E.R. Thayer (supra fn. 2), 808 and 809. See also F. Pollock (supra fn. 2), 55–56; F.H. Bohlen (supra fn. 2), 299n; P.H. Winfield (supra fn. 2), 193–4.
Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520, §§ 35–42, per Mason CJ and Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ.
(1866) LR 1 Exch 265, 287.
See, e.g., J.L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (1992), 368–9.
E.R. Thayer (supra fn. 2), 807–8.
J. Smith, Tort and Absolute Liability — Suggested Changes in Classification III (1917) 30 Harv L Rev 409, 410 and 414n.
Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520.
J. Smith (supra fn. 105), 414.
Fletcher v Rylands (1875) 3 H&C 774, 788.
Ibid., 797.
Ibid., 792.
P.H. Winfield (supra fn. 2), 193. See also E.R. Thayer, Judicial Legislation: Its Legitimate Function in the Development of the Common Law (1891) 5 Harv L Rev 172, 185.
See no. 24 above, C. Dalton (supra fn. 3), 151–72 and Coquillette (supra fn. 96), 769–81. Dalton (156–7) argues that Bramwell’s attempted innovation in the Court of Exchequer was to free the sic utere doctrine from specific and independently-recognised rights and duties, and to view such rights and duties as actually derived from the doctrine, not the other way around.
J.H. Wigmore, Responsiblity for Tortious Acts: Its History — III (1894) 7 Harv L Rev 441, 454.
Ibid., 455.
H. Maine, Dissertations on Early Law and Custom (1883), 389.
See, e.g., J.H. Baker (supra fn. 6), 67–9.
See, e.g., M.J. Prichard, Trespass, Case and the Rule in Williams v. Holland [1964] CLJ 234.
See, e.g., P.H. Winfield, The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts (1926) 42 LQR 184, especially 194–9.
Uniformity of Process Act 1832.
Bryant v Herbert (1878) 3 Common Pleas Division (CPD) 389, 390.
(1878) 3 CPD 389, 392 per Bramwell B.
C. Dalton (supra fn. 3), 28–9. In contrast, G. Samuel’s view that that the abolition of the forms of action left the common law “facing a genuine epistemological crisis” seems unduly alarmist: Classification of Obligations and the Impact of Constructivist Epistemologies (1997) 17 Legal Studies (LS) 448, 463.
F. Pollock, The Law of Torts: A Treatise on the Principles of Obligations Arising from Civil Wrongs in the Common Law (1887), vii (quoted by C. Dalton (supra fn. 3), 36).
F. Pollock, The Law of England I-L Victoriae (1887) 3 LQR 343, 345. (It is, admittedly, unlikely that Pollock was thinking here specifically of Rylands v Fletcher.)
See, e.g., Crompton v Lea (1874) LR 19 Equity Cases (Eq) 115, Humphries v Cousins (1877) 2 CPD 239 and Powell v Fall (1880) 5 Queen’s Bench Division (QBD) 597. Even from the early days, however, a number of specific defences were recognised: see no. 67 below.
(1873) 51 New York Reports (NY) 476, American Reports (10 Am Rep) 623.
(1873) 53 New Hampshire Reports (NH) 442, 16 Am Rep 372.
(1873) 51 NY 476, 486–7 per Earl C; Brown v Collins (1873) 53 NH 442, 450 per Doe J.
Brown v Collins, 53 NH 442, 445 per Doe J.
Losee v Buchanan (1873) 51 NY 476, 484 per Earl C.
Brown v Collins, 53 NH 442, 448. For further analysis, see J.P. Reid, Experience or Reason: The Tort Theories of Holmes and Doe (1965) 18 Vand L Rev 405, 411–20 (1965).
See, e.g., E.R. Thayer (supra fn. 2), 813; J. Smith (supra fn. 105), 413–4. See also J.B. Ames, Law and Morals (1908) 22 Harv L Rev 97, 97.
Read v J Lyons & Co [1947] AC 156, 171 per Lord Macmillan.
J.B. Ames, (supra fn. 133), 99.
J. Smith, Liability of the Landowners to Children Entering without Permission — II (1898) 11 Harv L Rev 434, 443.
E.R. Thayer (supra fn. 2), 814.
See, e.g., J.B. Ames (supra fn. 132), 109.
See, e.g., E.R. Thayer (supra fn. 2), 814–5.
See, generally, C. Dalton (supra fn. 3), 28–29 and 43–58.
C. Dalton (supra fn. 3), 53.
O.W. Holmes, The Theory of Torts (1873) 7 American Law Review (Am L Rev) 652.
O.W. Holmes (supra fn. 142), 653.
Ibid., 652.
O.W. Holmes, Trespass and Negligence (1880) 14 Am L Rev 1, incorporated the next year in O.W. Holmes (supra fn. 2).
O.W. Holmes (supra fn. 145), 27.
Ibid., 28.
Ibid., 28.
Consider, e.g., his apparent endorsement of the sentiment that “[n]o case or principle can be found, or if found can be maintained, subjecting an individual to liability for an act done with-out fault on his part” (supra fn. 2, 94–95).
G.E. White, Tort Law in America: An Intellectual History (2nd edn. 2003), 12–19 and 293–6; R.W. Gordon, Book Review (1981) 94 Harv L Rev 903, 916; PJ. Kelley, A Critical Analysis of Holmes’s Theory of Torts (1983) 61 Washington University Law Quarterly 681, 687–92; T.C. Grey, Accidental Torts (2001) 54 Vand L Rev 1225. E. Ursin, Judicial Creativity and Tort Law (1981) 49 George Washington Law Review 229, 271–6 argues that Holmes initially favoured fault liability, but came by the time of “The Path of the Law” in 1897 (supra fn. 34) to support particular innovations tending towards enterprise liability.
D. Rosenberg, The Hidden Holmes: His Theory of Torts in History (1995), criticised by A.W.B. Simpson, The Elusive Truth About Holmes (1997) 95 Mich L Rev 2027.
D. Rosenberg (supra fn. 151), 1.
O.W. Holmes (supra fn. 2), 125 and 115–17.
O.W. Holmes (supra fn. 145), 12. Incorporated in O.W. Holmes (supra fn. 2), 95–6.
O.W. Holmes (supra fn. 2), 149 referring to his lecture on “Trespass and Negligence” that formed the previous chapter of The Common Law (supra fn. 2), 77–129.
F. Pollock (supra fn. 2), 52.
Ibid., 55.
Ibid., 56. In other words, Pollock was arguing for a non-delegable duty of care.
F. Pollock, The Dog and the Potman: Or “Go it, Bob” (1909) 25 LQR 317, 321.
F. Pollock, “A Plea for Historical Interpretation” (1923) 39 LQR 163, 167.
Ibid.
O.W. Holmes (supra fn. 142), 653.
See nos. 10, 14 and 17 above.
W.R. Cornish/ G.deN. Clark, Law and Society in England 1750–1950 (1989), 484.
Fair v London & North Western Railway (1869) 21 Law Times Reports, New Series 326, 327.
R.W. Kostal, Law and English Railway Capitalism 1825–1875 (1994), 290 and 255.
Ibid., 257–79. The common employment rule was abolished by the Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948.
(1833) 10 Bingham’s Common Pleas Reports 112. See further M.J. Prichard (supra fn. 118).
Mitchil v Alestree (1676) 1 Ventris’ King’s Bench Reports 295 (bystander); Aston v Heaven(1797) 2 Espinasse’s Nisi Prius Reports 533 (passenger). In the case of the passenger, the same standard applied whether the claim was for breach of duty (tort) or assumpsit (contract).
Readhead v Midland Railway Co (1869) LR 4 Queen’s Bench (QB) 379.
Readhead v Midland Railway Co (1867) LR 2 QB 412.
See no. 14 above.
See, e.g., Fletcher v Rylands (1866) LR 1 Exch 265, 280 (where Blackburn thought there was an analogy with the strict liability on the owner of an animal he knows to have “a vicious propensity to attack man”) and 286 (where he talked of “drowning” as if this would be a mischief covered by the rule: but cf. fn. 238 below); Jones v Festiniog Railway Co (1868) LR 3 QB 733, where he applied the rule in a case of damage to a chattel (the plaintiffs haystack); and Cattle v Stockton Waterworks Co (1875) LR 10 QB 453, 457, where he suggested that workers in a flooded mine would be able to claim for damage to their clothes and tools. See further J. Murphy (supra fn. 3), 653-4. It may be noted that, though private nuisance is certainly now regarded as a tort to land, it still seems to allow for the award of damages for consequential loss of chattels: see Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655, 706 per Lord Hoffmann, criticised by K. Oliphant, Un-blurring the Boundaries of Nuisance (1998) 6 Tort Law Review 21, 28.
For an argument that the defence of “inevitable accident” made the liability substantially fault-based, see J.H. Baker (supra fn. 6), 404–5.
Holmes v Mather (1875) LR 10 Exch 261.
See no. 10 above.
(1875) LR 10 Exch 261, 267.
As is argued by C. Dalton (supra fn. 3), 101. She also observes (253) that Bramwell’s analysis of the collision cases is now suggestive of Blackburn’s approach in the Exchequer Chamber, based on the plaintiff’s implied assumption of the risk of non-negligent injury, whereas previously, in Rylands v Fletcher, he had focused on the difficulties of causal attribution in the absence of a criterion of fault.
(1875) LR 10 Exch 261, 263.
See nos. 14 and 41 above.
Fowler v Lanning [1959] 1 QB 426, 439 per Diplock J.
Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232, building on the first-instance decisions in Stanley v Powell[1891] 1 QB 86 and Fowler v Lanning [1959] 1 QB 426.
C. Dalton (supra fn. 3), 279–80.
G.C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in Enterprise Liability (1997) 95 Mich L Rev 1266, 1367.
J.B. Clutterbuck (supra fn. 29), 1132. See also G.K. Gardner, Insurance Against Tort Liability —An Approach to the Cosmology of Law (1950) 15 Law & Contemporary Problems 455, 462 (emphasising the role the case played in “living tort law” as the expression of commonly-held beliefs about enterprise responsibility).
R.E. Keeton (supra fn. 7), 402.
P. Schuck, Introduction, in P. Schuck (ed.), Tort Law and the Public Interest (1990), 17 (emphasis added).
D. Abraham, Liberty and Property: Lord Bramwell and the Political Economy of Liberal Jurisprudence Individualism, Freedom, and Utility (1994) 38 American Journal of Legal History (Am J Leg Hist) 288, 299.
R.L. Rabin (supra fn. 7), 1193.
For overviews, see J. Smith, Liability for Substantial Physical Damage to Land by Blasting — The Rule of the Future (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 542 and 667; C.O. Gregory (supra fn. 7), 370-82; V.E. Nolan/E. Ursin, The Revitalization of Hazardous Activity Strict Liability (1987) 65 Norih Carolina Law Review 257; and W.K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprises (1992) 92 Colum L Rev 1705.
Cf. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Torts, vols. 1–4 (1934–1939), §§ 519–520. See further R.W. James, Absolute Liability for Ultrahazardous Activities: An Appraisal of the Restatement Doctrine (1949) 37 California Law Review (Cal L Rev) 269.
American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law (Second), Torts, vols. 1–4 (1965—1979), § 402A.
Ibid., §§ 519–520. Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities is maintained in American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law (Third), Torts: Liability for Physical Harm (Proposed Final Draft No. I) (2005), § 20. See further W.K. Jones (supra fn. 190), 1709-15 and K.N. Hylton (supra fn. 15), 1433-36. For an English lawyer’s perspective, see K. Stanton (supra fn. 3), 88–95.
See, e.g., G.T. Schwartz (supra fn. 3), 238 (“plays a rather subsidiary role in modern American tort law”). Cf. V.E. Nolan/E. Ursin (supra fn. 190) and J.G. Anderson, The Rylands v. Fletcher Doctrine in America: Abnormally Dangerous, Ultrahazardous or Absolute Nuisance? 1978 Arizona State Law Journal 99.
See, e.g., W.E. Knepper, About Tomorrow’s Tort Trends (1966) 18 Syracuse Law Review (Syracuse L Rev) 1, 4; M.S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment (1974) 60 Va L Rev 1109, 1281 and citations in no. 44 above.
See A.W.B. Simpson, Victorian Judges and the Problem of Social Cost: Tipping v St Helen’s Smelting Company, in: Leading Cases in the Common Law (1995); J.K. Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution (1973) 3 J Leg Stud 403; J.P.S. McLaren, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution — Some Lessons from Social History (1983) 3 OJLS 155.
Hole v Barlow (1858) 27 Law Journal Reports, Common Pleas 207, 208 per Sir John Byles.
(1862) 3 Best and Smith Reports (B&S) 62, 122 ER 25.
(1862) 3 B&S 62, 84-5.
See, e.g., R.A. Epstein, For a Bramwell Revival (1994) 38 Am J Leg Hist 246, 277 (“here is the standard test of economic efficiency accurately stated... a half century before it made its way into standard economic theory”).
See R.A. Epstein (supra fn. 200); D. Abraham (supra fn. 188); and A. Ramasastry, The Parameters, Progressions, and Paradoxes of Baron Bramwell (1994) 38 Am J Leg Hist 322.
(1865) 11 Clark & Finelly’s House of Lords Reports (HLC) 642, 122 ER 588.
For further consideration of the nineteenth-century impact of the rule, see W.R. Cornish/ G.deN. Clark (supra fn. 164), 154–7.
(1862) 3 B&S 62, 85–6. Is this an indication that Bramwell failed to grasp that value is a function of individual preferences? For further comment, see P.S. Atiyah, Liability for Railway Nuisance in the English Common Law: A Historical Footnote (1980) 23 Journal of Law and Economy (J Law & Econ) 191, 194.
In fact, Lord Cairns’ Act of 1858 was later interpreted as giving the courts of equity the power to award damages for yet-to-be-sustained losses in lieu of an injunction, thereby effectively legalising the nuisance, but the Act was not so understood at this time, and the new jurisdiction was only authoritatively confirmed by the House of Lords in 1924 (Leeds Industrial Co-op Society Ltd v Slack [1924] AC 851). See further J.A. Jolowicz, Damages in Equity — A Study of Lord Cairn’s Act [1975] CLJ 224, 224–8.
(1865) 1 Chancery Appeal Cases 66.
A.W.B. Simpson (supra fn. 196), 190–91.
See further P.S. Atiyah (supra fn. 204) and A. Ramasastry (supra fn. 201), especially 356–363. In a breathtakingly wrong-headed article, David Abraham (supra fn. 188) credits Bramwell for the continuing and widespread perception that strict liability is “monstrous” (299), portrays his judgment in Bamford v Turnley (misspelled) as a demonstration that “public utility could not be served in a regime of strict liability” (297; Bramwell was in fact arguing the opposite), and heaps obloquy on Rylands v Fletcher without any mention at all of the fact that Bramwell had actually given judgment in the case for the plaintiff.
Especially Brand v Hammersmith and City Railway Co (1867) LR 2 QB 223 and Powell v Fall (1880) 5 QBD 597.
A. Ramasastry (supra fn. 201), 327.
See especially R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost (1960) 3 J Law & Econ 1.
A.W.B. Simpson (supra fn. 196), 174.
R.A. Epstein (supra fn. 200), 248–9.
Ibid., 276.
R.W. Gordon, Simpson’s Leading Cases (1997) 95 Mich L Rev 2044, 2052.
A. Ramasastry (supra fn. 201), 326.
Powell v Fall (1880) 5 QBD 597, 601.
G. Calabresi (supra fn. 21), ch. 5.
E.g. by P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979), 377.
See, e.g, I. Ayres/ E. Tally, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade (1995) 104 Yale LJ 1027; W. Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bar-gain after Judgment — A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral (1999) 66 U Chi L Rev 373.
R.A. Epstein (supra fn. 200), 278.
Brand v Hammersmith and City Railway Co (1867) LR 2 QB 223, 230.
(1862) 3 B&S 62, 84.
For a summary and critique, see R. A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication (1980) 8 Hofstra Law Review (Hofstra L Rev) 487, and J.L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization (1980) 8 Hofstra L Rev 509.
See A.W.B. Simpson (supra fn. 3), 218–20.
Vaughan v Taff Vale Railway Co (1860) 5 Hurlstone and Norman 679; Hammersmith and City-Railway Co v Brand (1869) LR 4 HL 171. The defence of statutory authorisation does not apply if the defendant has acted negligently (ibid.). In the absence of an express immunity, however, the very existence of the defence may be considered questionable. Enterprise liability theory holds that the public interest in the activity is no reason to withhold the payment of compensation to the statistically inevitable victims of its pursuit. From this perspective, it appears that the courts went further than was necessary in treating the statutory permission to conduct the activity as impliedly substituting fault for strict liability. Why should they not allow the activity but require compensation at the same time? In fact, Bramwell was exceptional in arguing for the survival of strict common law liabilities in such cases: see Brand v Hammersmith & City Rly Co (1867) LR 2 QB 223, 234 (obiter); Hammersmith and City Railway Co v Brand (1869) LR 4 HL 171, 193. (Bramwell had also gone with the plaintiff in the Court of Exchequer in Vaughan v Taff Vale Railway Co (1859) 3 Hurlstone & Norman’s Exchequer Reports (H&N) 743.) In both the leading cases, Blackburn was on the other side, acceding to the view that the plaintiff’s common law rights had been effectively revoked: see (1860) 5 H&N 679, 688’89 and (1869) LR 4 HL 171, 197.
A.W.B. Simpson (supra fn. 3), a revised version of an earlier article: A.W.B. Simpson, Legal Liability for Bursting Reservoirs: The Historical Context of Rylands v Fletcher (1984) 13 J Leg Stud 209. For criticism, see Schwartz (supra fn. 3), 236–7.
Ibid., 199–208.
Ibid., 205–6.
Ibid., 218.
(1865) 3 H&C 774, 790. Bramwell’s formulation is the reverse of the modern view that nuisance liability arises in respect of a single, isolated occurrence only if it results from a continuing state of affairs for which the defendant is responsible, the latter being the nuisance: see, e.g., Rogers (supra fn. 87), § 18.11; J. Murphy (supra fn. 87), 400.
Ibid., 792.
(1866) LR 1 Exch 265, 270.
See, generally, A.W.B. Simpson (supra fn. 3), 202–08. He suggests (212) that Rylands v Fletcher may have be plucked from the comparative obscurity of informal arbitration precisely because, after the Sheffield disaster, it was seen as a potentially leading case.
Hammersmith and City Railway Co v Brand (1869) LR 4 HL 171, on appeal from Brand v Hammersmith and City Railway Co (1867) LR 2 QB 223.
River Wear Commissioners v Adamson (1877) 2 AC 743. But cf. Blackburn’s support for strict liability in Readhead v Midland Railway Co (1867) LR 2 QB 412 and text accompanying fns. 170–171 above. It is for their lack of consistency, above all, that his judgments on tort are notable.
(1866) LR 1 Exch 265, 286. The argument is made by A.W.B. Simpson (supra fn. 3), 217. More likely, however, Blackburn was just using “drown” to mean “flood”, which is how he later employed the term in Cattle v Stockton Waterworks Co (1875) LR 10 QB 453, 457 (“drowned mine”).
C. Dalton (supra fn. 3).
(1880) 5 QBD 597.
(1880) 5 QBD 597, 601.
Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263, 280. But note the doubts expressed by Lord Goff in Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264, 308.
Perry v Kendricks Transport Ltd [1956] 1 WLR 85, 91 per Jenkins LJ.
Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 2 AC 1, 10 per Lord Bingham, and 19 per Lord Hoffmann.
Read v J Lyons & Co [1947] AC 156. For criticism, see J. Murphy (supra fn. 3), 644–56.
Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 2 AC 1, 19 per Lord Hoffmann.
Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520.
Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 2 AC 1, 20 per Lord Hoffmann.
London Passenger Transport Board v Upson [1949] AC 155.
Ibid., 168 per Lord Wright. This is not always so, however, as the standard of liability depends upon the precise statutory language: K. Stanton et al., Statutory Torts (2003), § 8.001.
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Oliphant, K. (2005). Rylands v Fletcher and the Emergence of Enterprise Liability in the Common Law. In: Koziol, H., Steininger, B.C. (eds) European Tort Law 2004. Tort and Insurance Law Yearbook, vol 2004. Springer, Vienna. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-211-30875-X_5
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