This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
<http://www.spainemb.org/information/constitucionin.htm>.
Instead of many see J. Pérez Royo, Curso de Derecho Constitucional (7th edn. 2000), 425; J.R. Polo Sabau, Libertad de expresión y derecho de acceso a los medios de comunicación (2002), 15 and L. de Carreras Serra, Régimen jurídico de la información (1996), 39. For a summary of the unitary and dualistic positions see J.M. Desantes Guanter/C. Soria, Los límites de la información (1991), 21–26.
That was the case in STC (Spanish Constitutional Court Decision) 6/1981, of 16 March, where the Constitutional Court held that the right to communicate “may be considered, in a certain sense, as merely a particular application of the freedom of expression and its explicit distinction can be found in recent constitutional texts only”. On the evolution of constitutional case-law see J.M. Desantes Guanter/ C. Soria (supra fn. 2), 20–26 and more summarized in J. Pérez Royo (supra fn. 2), 425–426.
FJ (Legal Ground) 2°. See along the same lines, STC 165/1987, of 27 October and STC 6/1988, of 21 January, FJ 5a.
J. R. Polo Sabau (supra fn. 2), 16.
As STC 172/1990, of 12 November states, “it is frequent and normal in the practice that a piece of information includes elements of value which do not distort the right of information as long as the preponderant element in what has been communicated is the informative one. In this respect, it must be pointed out that the appraisal of the facts is also a fundamental element of the right of information, which includes critical attitudes, even if they are energetic or acrimonious, as long as the terms that are being used are not excessive or out of any proportion with regard to the pursued aim of opposition or rejection. Therefore, it cannot be required that the information disseminated by the mass media is confined to the mere communication of neutral or strictly objective news (...) thereby reducing freedom of information to a harmless mechanical transmission of newsworthy facts. This blend of the description of facts and opinions, which ordinarily takes place when giving information, determines that truthfulness displays its legitimising effects with regard to the facts, but not with regard to the opinions that accompany them or the appraisal that is made about them, since opinions, personal beliefs or value judgments are not susceptible to verifi cation” (FJ 3°). See also J. Pérez Royo (supra fn. 2), 426.
See also SSTC (Decisions of Spanish Constitutional Court) 178/1992, 4/1996 and 138/1996.
See F.J. Bastida Freijedo/ I. Villaver de Menéndez, Libertades de Expresión e Información y Medios de Comunicación (1998), 28, who point out, however, that the supposed soundess of this line of argumentation presents difficulties in the practice of the Constitutional Court with regard to establishing when one aspect is preponderant or not.
L. de Carreras Serra (supra fn. 2), 41; J. Bernal del Castillo, Honor, verdad e información (1994), 255.
See STC 101/2003, of 2 June, FJ 3rd.
STC 6/198, of 16 March 1981, FJ 4° and STC 86/1982, of 23 December 1982, FJ 3a.
F. J. Bastida Freijedo/ I. Villaverde Menéndez (supra fn. 8), 31.
L. de Carreras Serra (supra fn. 2), 45; L. Escobar de la Serna, Manual de Derecho de la información (1997), 389.
J. Pérez Royo (supra fn. 2), 427.
L. Escobar de la Serna (supra fn. 13), 386, refers to two essential aspects: the right to freedom of ideology, religion and worship of individuals and communities and the right to freely express and disseminate thoughts, ideas and opinions. To these two aspects, the right to information or right to be able to freely communicate and receive information must be added. By contrast, L. de Carreras Serra (supra fn. 2), 42, refers to three elements: freedom of ideology, the right to receive truthful information (as a passim right of information) and the freedom to express one’s own opinion.
A. Jiménez-Blanco/ G. Jiménez-Blanco/ P. Mayor/ L. Osorio, Comentario a la Constitución. La jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional (1995), 161.
See A. Jiménez-Blanco/ G. Jiménez-Blanco/ P. Mayor/ L. Osorio Comentario a la Constitución. La jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional (1995) (supra fn. 16), 166.
L. de Carreras Serra (supra fn. 2), 47.
L. Escobar de la Serna (supra fn. 13), 380–381; L. de Carreras Serra (supra fn. 2), 47.
A. Jiménez-Blanco/ G. Jiménez-Blanco/ P. Mayor/ L. Osorio Comentario a la Constitución. La jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional (1995) (supra fn. 16), 167.
L. de Carreras Serra (supra fn. 2), 48; L. Escobar de la Serna (supra fn. 13), 382–383.
F. J. Bastida Freijedo/ I. Villaverde Menéndez (supra fn. 8), 34.
F. J. Bastida Freijedo/ I. Villaverde Menéndez (supra fn. 8), 32–33.
With regard to this previous distinction, see also STS 4.11.2002 [RJ 2002-p-9629].
In fact, it seems that two different stages can be distinguished in the case-law of the Constitutional Court. In the first stage, the rights of honour, privacy and to one’s own image seem to prevail over the freedoms enshrined in Art. 20 CE, and the so-called “animus iniuriandi” or “infamandi” over the “animus criticandi” or “informandi”. However, from STC 104/1986, of 17 July on, the second stage starts where the liberties enshrined in Art. 20 CE prevail and, in accordance with the fundamental role that these liberties play in a democratic society, the rights of honour, privacy and to one’s own image enshrined in Art. 18 CE are considered as limits to the freedoms of expression and information (see A. Jiménez-Blanco/ G. Jiménez-Blanco/ P. Mayor/ L. Osorio Comentario a la Constitución. La jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional (1995) (supra fn. 16), 176–177.
Thus J.L. Lacruz Berdejo et al., Elementos de Derecho Civil I. Parte General del Derecho Civil, vol 2°, Personas (1990), 86.
A. Jiménez-Blanco/ G. Jiménez-Blanco/ P. Mayor/ L. Osorio Comentario a la Constitución. La jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional (1995) (supra fn. 16), 179.
See also STS 29.3.2001 [RJ 2001-p-6637], which declares that the protection of the right of honour “gives in to the constitutional right to give truthful information enshrined in Art. 20.1.d) CE”.
Boletín Oficial del Estado (BOE) no. 115, 15.5.1982. STC 9/1990, of 18 January 1990 repealed part of the second section of Art. 2.
Instead of many see F. de Castro y Bravo, Temas de Derecho Civil (1972); J. Castán Tobeñas, Derecho Civil Español. Común y Foral, Tomo. I, Introducción y Parte General. Volumen Segundo. Teoría de la relación jurídica (1984), 390 et seq.
Thus, for instance, J. Castán Tobeñas (supra fn. 32), 396, when dealing with the so-called “right to confidentiality of private life”, asserted that the rights protecting the inviolability of private life against invasions and indiscretions of others are “closely connected to the right of honour — to the extent that some writers include them in it”.
In this sense, M. Yzquierdo Tolsada, in: L.F. Reglero Campos (ed.), Tratado de responsabilidad civil (2nd edn. 2003), 1234.
Instead of many M. Yzquierdo Tolsada, in: L.F. Reglero Campos (ed.), (supra fn. 34), 1192; P. Salvador Coderch et al., ¿Qué es difamar? Libelo contra la ley del libelo (1987), 18 et seq. Other legal scholars, by contrast, consider that this unifying legal treatment is acceptable to the extent that the links existing between these rights are so close that most of the time it is very difficult to differentiate them (L. Díez-Picazo/A. Gullón, Sistema de Derecho Civil I, Introducción. Derecho de la Persona. Autonomía Privada. Persona Jurídica (11th edn. 2003), 345).
See J. Delgado Echevarría, in: J.L. Lacruz Berdejo et al., (supra fn. 27), 95.
In this sense, L. Díez-Picazo/ A. Gullón (supra fn. 35), 346.
J. Delgado Echevarría, in: J.L. Lacruz Berdejo et al. (supra fn. 27), 89–96, starts out from a delimitation of the notion “illegitimate invasion” in three parts. Accordingly, he speaks of a “positive delimitation”, which can be found in the invasions included in Art. 7 LO 1/1982; a “negative delimitation”, which is carried out by Art. 8, whereas the rules of Art. 2 are what he calls “functional delimitation”, to the extent that it provides for the relative character of the rights governed by the Act.
In this sense, A.L. Cabezuelo Arenas, Derecho a la intimidad (1998), 108; T. Vidal Marín, El derecho al honor y su protección desde la Constitución Española (2000), 115. Against this position, in particular with regard to the right of honour, F. Igartúa Arregui, La protección del honor y la intimidad. Comentario a la Sentencia de la Sala Primera del Tribunal Supremo de 4 de noviembre de 1986 (1987), 96. In case-law some decisions such as STS 28.10.1986 [RJ 1986-p-6015], among others, accept the open character of the enumeration carried out in Art. 7 LO 1/1982.
In this sense, L. Díez-Picazo/ A. Gullón (supra fn. 35), 354.
See A.L. Cabezuelo Arenas (supra fn. 42), 116–118 and M. Yzquierdo Tolsada, in: L.F. Reglero Campos (supra fn. 34), 1214–1215.
L. Díez-Picazo/ A. Gullón (supra fn. 35), 354.
M. Yzquierdo Tolsada, in: L.F. Reglero Campos (ed.), (supra fn. 34), 1197.
In this sense, L. Díez-Picazo/ A. Gullón (supra fn. 35), 354.
See A. Azurmendi Adarraga, El derecho a la propia imagen: su identidad y aproximación al derecho a la información (1997), 187–195. F. Igártua Arregui, in: P. Salvador Coderch (ed.), El mercado de las ideas (1990), 321, considers that these two sections of Art. 7 encompass three aspects of the right to one’s own image: it is protected as an instrument of the right to privacy (Art. 7.5), as a patrimonial asset (Art. 7.6) and as an aspect of personality (Art. 7.5, where it also qualifies the capture and reproduction of the image outside the sphere of privacy as an invasion — with the exceptions provided by Art. 8.2).
As explained by F. Igártua Arregui, in: P. Salvador Coderch (ed.), (supra fn. 48), 321. An example of this instrumental function of the right to one’s own image directly connected to the right of privacy can be found in STS 29.3.1988 [RJ 1988-p-2480]. The Supreme Court considered here that an illegitimate invasion into the privacy of a well-known Spanish actress (Sara Montiel) had taken place when a magazine (Interviú) published the pictures that had been taken of her with telephoto lenses while she sunbathed topless on an uncrowded beach in Menorca. The Supreme Court held that the fact that the place was “uncrowded and far away from population centres” indicated that the actress wished to preserve her privacy.
In this sense, F. Igartua Arregui, in: P. Salvador Coderch (ed.), (supra fn. 48), 321.
Critical with regard to the scope of this reform, M. Yzquierdo Tolsada, in: L.F. Reglero Campos (ed.), (supra fn. 34), 1206.
In many of its decisions the Constitutional Court has held that honour refers to good reputation “which consists in the opinion that people have of a person, which is good or positive if the word is not accompanied by any adjective”. Hence the invasion takes place “as the result of expressions which are proffered in discredit or contempt of someone or which are considered by the public as insulting” (STC 76/1995, of 22 May).
L. De Carreras Serra (supra fn. 2), 72.
Critical towards this legislative option T. Vidal Marín (supra fn. 42), 123–124, who considers that the legal reference to the subjective aspect of honour runs the risk of making its legal protection dependant on the changing feelings of the individual as well as on her greater or lesser sensitivity.
In this sense, T. Vidal Marín (supra fn. 42), 118.
See T. Vidal Marín (supra fn. 42), 119–120.
M. Yzquierdo Tolsada, in: L.F. Reglero Campos (ed.), (supra fn. 34), 1208.
M. Yzquierdo Tolsada, in: L.F. Reglero Campos (ed.), (supra fn. 34), 1209.
A. L. Cabezuelo Arenas (supra fn. 42), 133–138.
F. Herrero-Tejedor, Honor, intimidad y propia imagen (1990), 226; T. Vidal Marín (supra fn. 42), 127.
T. Vidal Marín (supra fn. 42), 128.
Ley Orgánica 4/1997, de 4 de agosto, por la que se regula la utilización de videocámaras por las Fuerzas y Cuerpos de Seguridad en lugares públicos (BOE of 5 August 1997, no. 186, 23824).
In this sense T. Vidal Marín (supra fn. 42), 131, who, however, admits that in certain cases it is possible for its application to be extended to the right of honour, as shown in Art. 9.2 LO 1/1982, which empowers judges and courts to disseminate the judgment issued against the person who has committed an illegitimate invasion into any of the rights of the personality which are protected by the Organic Act.
L. Díez-Picazo/ A. Gullón, Instituciones de Derecho Civil (I/1) (2nd edn. 1995), 224; J.M. Lete del Río, Derecho de la Persona (4th edn. 2000), 270.
M. Yzquierdo Tolsada, in: L.F. Reglero Campos (ed.), (supra fn. 34), 1221.
L. Díez-Picazo/ A. Gullón (supra fn. 64), 224; J.M. Lete del Río (supra fn. 64), 271.
J. M. Lete del Río (supra fn. 64), 271.
According to L. Díez-Picazo/ A. Gullón (supra fn. 35), 347 this solution, besides being incoherent with the criterion introduced by the reforms of 1981 and the LO 1/1982, is quite odd, since it applies to illegitimate invasions caused by the use of the image or the name of the minor only, but not in the case of invasions caused in a different way (as for instance, by the circulation of news). Moreover, it is not coherent with the rule of Art. 2 LO 1/1996, which provides that any limitation in the capacity of minors will undergo strict construction.
Instead of many see F. Herrero-Tejedor (supra fn. 60), 226; M. Yzquierdo Tolsada, in: L.F. Reglero Campos (supra fn. 34), 1208.
See M. Yzquierdo Tolsada, in: L.F. Reglero Campos (ed.), (supra fn. 34), 1208 and A. Carrasco Perera (ed.), Derecho Civil (1996), 89.
In this sense P. Salvador/ M.T. Castiñeira/ D. Felip/ M. Ysás/ J.J. Cano/ S. Durany/ E. Gadea (supra fn. 35), 52–59 and also P. Salvador Coderch (supra fn. 48), 251.
In legal scholarship see M. Yzquierdo Tolsada, Sistema de responsabilidad civil, contractual y extracontractual (2001), 184 and T. Vidal Marín (supra fn. 42), 227.
In this sense, M. de Cossío, Derecho al honor. Técnicas de protección y límites (1993), 76 and M. Yzquierdo Tolsada (supra fn. 74), 184 and M. Yzquierdo Tolsada in: L.F. Reglero Campos (supra fn. 34), 1258.
See, instead of many, M. Martín-Casals, in: P. Salvador Coderch (ed.), (supra fn. 48), 382 et seq.
BOE no. 74, of 27.3.1984, 8387. Correction of mistakes BOE no. 90, of 14.4.1984, 10661.
M. Martín-Casals, in: (supra fn. 48), 383.
As amended by LO 8/2002, de 24 de octubre, complementaria de la Ley de reforma parcial de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal, sobre procedimiento para el enjuiciamiento rápido e inmediato de determinados delitos y faltas, y de modificación del procedimiento abreviado [complementary to the Act of partial amendment of the Criminal Proceedings Act for a speedy and immediate judgment of certain crimes and misdemeanours and amending the abbreviated proceedings], BOE no. 258, of 28.10.2002.
With regard to the right of honour T. Vidal Marín (supra fn. 42), 209 and, in general terms, F. Herrero-Tejedor (supra fn. 60), 274. For one of the very few decisions establishing the discontinuation of a television programme see STC 187/1999, of 25 October.
See, in this sense, T. Vidal Marín (supra fn. 42), 212 and M. Yzquierdo, in: L.F. Reglero Campos (supra fn. 34), 1237.
The distinction had been adopted by the now repealed Art. 58 (right of reply) and Art. 62 (right of correction) of the 1966 Act of Press and Printing, see T. Vidal Marín (supra fn. 42), 228.
J. Delgado Echevarría, in: J.L. Lacruz Berdejo et al. (supra fn. 27), 81; T. Vidal Marín (supra fn. 42), 233.
In legal scholarship see L. Díez-Picazo/ A.. Gullón (supra fn. 35), 355; M. Martín Casals, in: P. Salvador Coderch (supra fn. 48), 384 et seq.; M. Yzquierdo Tosada, in: L.F. Reglero Campos (supra fn. 34), 1239; M. de Cossio (supra fn. 75), 73; A. Azurmendi Adarraga (supra fn. 48), 228. In case-law see, among many others, SSTS 15.2.2000 [RJ 2000-p-1157]; 30.3.2001 [RJ 2001-p-4776] and 25.11.2002 [RJ 2002-p-10274].
In this sense, M. de Cossio (supra fn. 75), 73, points out that whereas with regard to non-pecuniary losses the presumption is irrebutable, with regard to pecuinary loss it is iuris tantum only. As isolated decisions in this sense see also STS 27.1.1998 [RJ 1998-p-551] and STS 31.12.2002 [RJ 2003-p-335].
In this sense M. Martín Casals, in: P. Salvador Coderch (supra fn. 48), 385 and thereafter, among many others, M. Yzquierdo Tolsada, in: L.F. Reglero Campos (supra fn. 34), 1239 and T. Vidal Marín (supra fn. 42), 218.
M. Martín Casals, in: P. Salvador Coderch (supra fn. 48), 385; T. Vidal Marín (supra fn. 42), 218.
In legal writing see, for instance, X. O’Callaghan Muñoz, Libertad de expresión y sus límites: honor, intimidad e imagen (1991), 202. In case-law see STS 25.4.1989 [RJ 1989-p-3260] when stating that “the Organic Act 1/1982, of 5 May, which governs these proceedings, provides expressly in Art. 9.3 that compensation will extend to non-pecuniary loss; and in this case the damage is presumed «iuris et de iure» and it is declared as existent, in all certainty, in the form of pain and anxiety”.
M. de Cossío (supra fn. 75), 73; J. Vidal Martínez, El derecho a la intimidad en la Ley Orgánica de 5-5-1982 (1984), 146.
This is the opinion held, among others, by L. Díez-Picazo/ A.. Gullón (supra fn. 35), 355; J.M. Lete del Río (supra fn. 64), 275; T. Vidal Marín (supra fn. 42), 219; F. Herrero-Tejedor (supra fn. 60), 268, although the later legal scholar, however, considers that the presumption encompasses both pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses.
M. Martín Casals, in: P. Salvador Coderch (supra fn. 48), 388.
M. Martín Casals, in: P. Salvador Coderch (supra fn. 48), 389–390; M. Yzquierdo Tolsada, in: L.F. Reglero Campos (supra fn. 34), 1241.
M. Martín Casals, in: P. Salvador Coderch (supra fn. 48), 392 and also M. Martín Casals, Notas sobre la indemnización del daño moral en las acciones por difamación de la LO 1/1982, in: Asociación de Profesores de Derecho Civil (ed.), Libro del Centenario del Código Civil (1990).
As pointed out by M. Martín Casals, in: P. Salvador Coderch (supra fn. 48), 393, it is necessary to bear in mind that Art. 9.3 does not appraise the gravity of the conduct of the tortfeasor causing the invasion but the gravity of the damage, something which confirms that the civil legislator does not aim at punishing the tortfeasor. Along the same lines see T. Vidal Marín (supra fn. 42), 224.
M. Martín Casals, in: P. Salvador Coderch (supra fn. 48), 392–396 and also M. Martín Casals (supra fn. 102), 1272 et seq..
In this sense, L.F. Reglero Campos, in: L.F. Reglero Campos (supra fn. 34), 76–89.
Against the possibility that the Spanish legal system allows punitive damages to be awarded see, in general terms, F. Pantaleón, in: R. Bercovitz/ L. Díez-Picazo/ C. Paz-Ares/ P. Salvador, Comentarios del Código Civil II, com. art. 1902 (1991), 1971; R. de Ángel Yágüez, Tratado de responsabilidad civil (1993), 60; M. Martín Casals, in: P. Salvador Coderch (supra fn. 48), 392; F. Pantaleón, La Constitución, el honor y unos abrigos [1996] 3 La Ley, 1690; M. Yzquierdo Tolsada (supra fn. 74), 52.
Instead of many see M. Martín Casals, in: P. Salvador Coderch (supra fn. 48), 393.
In favour of applying Art. 1107 Code civil (CC) to obligations arising from tort see F. Rivero, in: J.L. Lacruz et al., Elementos de Derecho Civil. II. Derecho de Obligaciones vol. 2. Contratos y cuasicontratos. Delito y cuasidelito (1999), 504–404; A. Gullón, in: L. Díez-Picazo/A. Gullón, Sistema de derecho civil, vol. II. El contrato en general. La relación obligatoria. Contratos en especial. Cuasi contratos. Enriquecimiento sin causa. Responsabilidad extracontractual (1995), 617; R. de Ángel Llagues (supra fn. 107), 802–809; A. De Cossío, El dolo en el Derecho Civil (1955), 138 et seq.
Cf. M. Martín Casals, in: P. Salvador Coderch (supra fn. 48), 393. See along the same lines R. de Ángel Yágüez (supra fn. 107), 808, who states that “the scope of causation is affected by the gravity of the fault in this sense: the tortfeasor is liable for more consequences when he has acted with intent than when he has been slightly negligent (...). The gravity of fault will play a role when deciding for which damage one must be held liable, but once the damage has been established (i.e. once fixed the damage caused in the sense of Art. 1902 CC) the obligation is in full and indivisible”.
M. Martín Casals Notas sobre la indemnización del daño moral en las acciones por difamación de la LO 1/1982, in: Asociación de Profesores de Derecho Civil (ed.), Libro del Centenario del Código Civil (1990) (supra fn. 102), 1258 et seq.
M. Martín Casals, in: P. Salvador Coderch (supra fn. 48), 395.
M. Martín Casals Notas sobre la indemnización del daño moral en las acciones por difamación de la LO 1/1982, in: Asociación de Profesores de Derecho Civil (ed.), Libro del Centenario del Código Civil (1990) (supra fn. 102), 1264.
See, however, the critical comment of Á. Carrasco Perera, Com. STS 14 de diciembre 1993, [1993] 33 Cuadernos Civitas de Jurisprudencia Civil, 1105–1117.
M. Martín Casals, in: P. Salvador Coderch (supra fn. 48), 396.
M. Martín Casals, in: P. Salvador Coderch (supra fn. 48), 397.
In fact this is, by far, one of the cases that has had more impact on the Spanish media and on legal circles over the last few years. Unfortunately, however, the impact has not been caused by the merits of the case or by the popularity of Ms. Isabel Preysler, but because it has given cause for a deplorable institutional conflict between the Spanish Supreme Court and the Spanish Constitutional Court in a series of decisions such as STS 31.12.1996 [RJ 1996-p-9226], which gave rise to STC 115/1999, of 5 May, and which, in its turn, was the grounds for a “reply” of the Supreme Court in STS de 20.7.2000 [RJ 2000-p-6184]; finally this decision was annulled by the Constitutional Court in STC 186/2001, of 17 September. The controversy still continued in STS 5.11.2001 [RJ 2002-p-677], which was issued in a proceedings which had nothing to do with the case but where the Supreme Court saw fit to give acrimonious criticism of the opinions of the Constitutional Court held in this case. See in detail P. Salvador Coderch/ S. Ramos González/ A. Luna Yerga/ C. Gómez Ligüerre, Libertad de expresión y luchas de poder entre tribunales, in: P. Salvador Coderch/ F. Gómez Pomar (ed.), Libertad de expresión y conflicto institucional: cinco estudios sobre la aplicación judicial de los derechos al honor, intimidad y propia imagen (2002), 19–47.
M. Martín Casals, in: P. Salvador Coderch (supra fn. 48), 398; T. Vidal Marín (supra fn. 42), 224.
T. Vidal Marín (supra fn. 42), 224.
M. Yzquierdo Tolsada (supra fn. 74), 178.
See X. Basozabal Arrue, Enriquecimiento injustificado por intromisión en derecho ajeno (1998).
See M. Martín Casals, in: P. Salvador Coderch (supra fn. 48), 399 and M. Yzquierdo Tolsada (supra fn. 74), 178–179.
See M. Martín Casals, in: P. Salvador Coderch (supra fn. 48), 399 and M. Yzquierdo Tolsada, in: L.F. Reglero Campos (supra fn. 34), 1241.
M. Martín Casals, in: P. Salvador Coderch (supra fn. 48), 398–399.
See, instead of many, M. Martín Casals, in: P. Salvador Coderch (supra fn. 48), 407 and M. Yzquierdo Tolsada, in: L.F. Reglero Campos (supra fn. 34), 1242–1245.
See L. Díez-Picazo/ A. Gullón (supra fn. 35), 356; M. Yzquierdo Tolsada (supra fn. 74), 176 and STS 28.9.1998 [RJ 1998-p-6800], which states that “Art. 9.5 of the already mentioned Organic Act, which has not admitted prescription, has expressly adopted caducidad, as this clearly results from the debate which took place in the Senate and was recorded in Diario de Sesiones del Senado, 17 March 1982, 7311)” (also in this sense STS 22.11.2002 [RJ 2002-p-10364).
Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2005 Springer-Verlag/Wien
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Martín-Casals, M., Feliu, J.S. (2005). Spain. In: Koziol, H., Warzilek, A. (eds) Persönlichkeitsschutz gegenüber Massenmedien. Tort and Insurance Law, vol 13. Springer, Vienna. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-211-29443-0_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-211-29443-0_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Vienna
Print ISBN: 978-3-211-23835-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-211-29443-7
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Science (German Language)