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Liability Based on Fault

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  1. All appearing in P. Widmer (ed.), Unification of Tort Law: Fault (forthcoming 2005, hereafter quoted as PETL Fault); in particular: H. Koziol, Austria, no. 1; I. Gilead, Israel, no. 1; G. Schwartz/M. Green, USA, no. 1; M. Martin-Casals/J. Solé, Spain, no. 1.

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  2. W.V.H. Rogers, England, PETL Fault, no. 1.

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  3. S. Galand-Carval, France, PETL Fault, no. 1: “Fault was more than a ground for tortious liability: it constituted its very foundation”).

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  4. B.A. Koch/ H. Koziol, Comparative Conclusions, in B.A. Koch/ H. Koziol (eds.), Unification of Tort Law: Strict Liability (2002, hereafter cited as PETL Strict Liability) 395, and infra the commentary to Chapter 5. Another explanation for fault-independent liability, by inverting the perspective from the author of the damage to the person who suffers it, was offered by some French authors, such as Starck, with the idea of “guarantee” (théorie de la garantie; see G. Viney, Introduction à la responsabilité civile, in: J. Ghestin (ed.), Traité de droit civil (2nd edn. dy1995) § 54.

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  5. See e.g. the Dutch Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek Art. 6:162/1+3; the new Civil Code of Quebec, Art. 1457; the Swiss Reform Project 2000, Art. 41 and Art. 48 et seq. COS; the Austrian Reform Project 2004, §§ 1292 and 1295 et seq. ABGB.

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  6. Infra Art. 4:101 no. 6; see also C. Canaris, Die Gefährdungshaftung im Lichte der neueren Rechtsentwicklung, [1995] Juristische Blätter (JB1), 2 (16); this author considers liability based on fault as being “eine rechtsethische Selbstverständlichkeit” (selfunderstanding under the aspect of legal ethics)”, therefore having “eine gewisse rechtsethische Überlegenheit (a higher dignity from the viewpoint of legal ethics)”.

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  7. P. Widmer, Comparative Report, PETL Fault, no. 43 et seq.; see also H. Koziol, Liability based on Fault: Subjective or Objective Yardstick? in [1998] Maastricht Journal V/2, 111 et seq.; Ch. von. Bar, The Common European Law of Torts II (2000) no. 226 et seq.

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  8. Ch. von Bar (supra fn. 7), no. 235. As a matter of fact, some members of the Group would have preferred to return to a more subjective concept of fault and a clearer distinction between fault-based and strict liability. They consider that it is contradictory to adopt, on the one hand, a very severe — objective — notion of fault, which is almost identical with that of wrongfulness, and to be so extremely restrictive, on the other hand, in accepting forms of (truly) objective liability, as is the case in Art. 5:101 of the Principles.

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  9. See on this topic also Ch. von Bar (supra fn. 7), no. 237 et seq. (“Degrees of Blameworthiness”), in particular no. 242–243.

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  10. Supra Art. 3:201 no. 17.

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  11. Infra Art. 10:401 no. 1.

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  12. Swiss law is particularly rich in such experience; see P. Widmer, Switzerland, PETL Fault, no. 8 et seq.; idem, Switzerland, PETL Strict Liability, no. 2, 3, 6 et seq.

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  13. See infra Art. 4:201 no. 2, 7; further the introduction to Chapter 5.

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  14. B. Winiger, La responsabilité aquilienne romaine — Damnum iniuria datum (1997) 95 et seq., 187: “Initialement, … la LA [Lex Aquilia] formule avec le DID [Damnum Iniuria Datum] une responsabilité objective pure.”; idem, La responsabilité aquilienne en droit commun — Damnum culpa datum (2002) 76 et seq., 220 et seq.

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  15. For a description of this evolution, P. Widmer, Fonction et evolution de la responsabilité pour risque, 76 [1977] Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht (ZSR) I, 417 et seq.; idem, Le visage actuel de la responsabilité civile en droit suisse, in: Développements récents du droit de la responsabilité civile (1991) 7 et seq.; see also: Ch. von Bar (supra fn. 7), no. 313.

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  16. In this sense, the Superior Court of Appeal of Munich (Münchener Oberappellationsgerichi) held in 1861 that: “operating a railway with locomotives constitutes necessarily and inevitably a culpable behaviour”; see 14 [1861] Seuffert’s Archiv, no. 208, p. 354 et seq.

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  17. P. Widmer, Comparative Report, PETL Fault, no. 31 et seq.; Ch. von Bar, The Common European Law of Torts I (1998) no. 61 et seq., in particular 66 et seq.

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  18. Ch. von Bar (supra fn. 18), no. 11.

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  19. Supra Introduction fn. 9.

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  20. See infra Art. 5:101 no. 28; B.A. Koch/ H. Koziol, Comparative Conclusions, PETL Strict Liability, no. 48 et seq., in particular no. 71–74.

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  21. The elementary distinction between liability “with and without personal misconduct” is also an essential systematic criterion in Ch. von Bar (supra fn. 18), 5 et seq., idem (supra fn. 7), no. 179–305, 306–410. B.A. Koch/H. Koziol, Comparative Conclusions, PETL Strict Liability, no. 157.

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  22. This is also the reason why the Principles establish a strict liability for dangerous activities, and not just for things, vehicles, energies etc.; see infra Art. 5:101 no. 18.

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  23. Supra Introduction to Chapter 4, no. 4.

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  24. Supra Art. 1:101 no. 5.

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  25. On the strange concept of “objective retrospective prognosis”, see P. Widmer, Switzerland, in J. Spier (ed.), Unification of Tort Law: Causation (2000, hereafter quoted as PETL Causation) 108.

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  26. P. Widmer, Switzerland, PETL Causation, 112.

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  27. On the interaction between fault and risk-based liabilities; Ch. von Bar (supra fn. 7), no. 329 et seq.

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  28. See infra Art. 5:101 no. 14–15.

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  29. See infra Chapter 6 no. 19.

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  30. M. Faure, Enonomic Analysis, PETL Fault, no. 40 et seq.

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  31. In particular Germany and Austria; see W.V.H. Rogers (ed.), Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss in a Comparative Perspective (2001): E. Karner/H. Koziol, Austria, no. 1 et seq.; U. Magnus/J. Fedtke, Germany, no. 1 et seq. On the reform in Germany: H.-G. Bollweg/M. Hellmann, Das neue Schadensersatzrecht (2003) 22 and 55 et seq., 195 et seq.; on the Austrian reform project: Verhandlungen des 15. Österreichischen Juristentages, Bürgerliches Recht (2004, http://www.juristentag.at/files/juristentag_2003/zivilrecht_15.pdf).

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  32. See infra the commentary to Art. 10:301 no. 9.

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  33. See in this sense also infra the comments ad Art. 10:401.

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  34. Infra Art. 4:102 no. 9.

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  35. Infra no. 19 et seq.

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  36. See H. Koziol, Liability based on Fault: Subjective or Objective Yardstick? in [1998] Maastricht Journal V/2, 118.

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  37. See PETL Fault, Questionnaire, Part II, case no. 7.

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  38. See on this topic: W.V.H. Rogers, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (16th ed. 2002) Chapter I: Nature and Functions of the Law of Torts; P. Widmer, Privatrechtliche Haftung, in: P. Münch/Th. Geiser (eds.), Schaden-Haftung-Versicherung, Handbücher für die Anwaltspraxis vol. V (1999) no. 2.2–2.5.

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  39. See infra Art. 7:101 and the comments thereto.

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  40. See e.g. for Swiss law: K. Oftinger/ E. Stark, Schweizerisches Haftpflichtrecht, Allgemeiner Teil, (5th ed. 1996) § 3 no. 54 et seq.; P. Widmer, Gefahren des Gefahrensatzes, in 106 [1970] ZBJV (Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins), 289 et seq., 307 et seq.; in the opposite sense recently: M. Jaun, Gefahrensatz — Gefahr oder Chance, [2003] ZBJV 139, 141 et seq.

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  41. See supra Art. 4:101 no. 11.

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  42. See in particular Austria, § 1299 ABGB.

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  43. See supra Art. 4:101 no. 9 and fn. 8.

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  44. Infra no. 14 et seq.

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  45. See supra Art. 2:102 para. 4 and the comments thereto.

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  46. Supra no. 9.

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  47. M. Faure, Economic Analysis, PETL Fault, no. 11 et seq.

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  48. Supra no. 11 and Introduction no. 3 and 8.

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  49. Infra Chapter 7, Art. 7:101 et seq.

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  50. Austria, Germany, the Netherlands; see P. Widmer, Comparative Report, PETL Fault, no. 29; see also Art. 3:103 para. 2 of the Draft Articles on Tort Law of the Working Team on Extra-Contractual Obligations of the Study Group on a European Civil Code (see supra General Introduction no. 40).

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  51. See infra the illustration in no. 25.

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  52. Supra no. 9.

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  53. The question could seriously be posed, however, if one could not admit the responsibility of the hospital (according to Art. 4:202 “Enterprise Liability”) which was not organized in a proper way, so as to prevent its personnel from prolonging their work over the prescribed limits. Cf. Art. 4:202 no. 5.

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  54. See also P. Widmer, Comparative Report, PETL Fault, no. 18.

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  55. See also supra no. 7 and Art. 2:102 para. 4.

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  56. Introduction no. 4; see also Art. 4:101 no. 16.

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  57. Supra no. 4.

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  58. P. Widmer, Switzerland, in H. Koziol (ed.), Unification of Tort Law: Wrongfulness (1998, hereafter cited as PETL Wrongfulness) 122 et seq.

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  59. See PETL Fault, Responses to case no. 1 in the Questionnaire.

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  60. J. Spier/ O. Haazen, Comparative Conclusions on Causation, PETL Causation, 132 et seq.

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  61. See infra Illustrations no. 24.

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  62. P. Widmer, Switzerland, PETL Wrongfulness 122 et seq.

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  63. PETL Fault, Comparative Report, no. 45.

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  64. PETL Fault, Comparative Report, no. 47.

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  65. See Introduction no. 3 and fn. 8.

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  66. Infra Chapter 5, no. 16 and 19.

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  67. PETL Fault, Questionnaire, case no. 1.

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  68. Supra no. 19.

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  69. PETL Fault, Questionnaire, case no. 10.

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  70. DFC 103 (1977) II 330 et seq.

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  71. PETL Fault, Questionnaire, case no. 2; see also DFC 100 (1974) 332 et seq.; DFC 104 (1978) II 184 et seq.

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  72. PETL Fault, Questionnaire, case no. 4a.

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  73. DFC 101 (1975) II 101 69 et seq.

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  74. Mainly in the field of criminal law, see e.g. Art. 450 of the Dutch Criminal Code; Art. 128 of the Swiss Penal Code.

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  75. The Hippocratic Oath (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/doctors/oath_modern.html) and, as an example, Art. 7 of the Italian Codice di Deontologia Medica (http://www.fnomceo.it/artO7G.htm).

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  76. Supra Art. 4:102 no. 29.

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  77. C.W. Canaris, Die Vertrauenshaftung im deutschen Privatrecht (1971); P. Chappuis/B. Winiger (eds.), La responsabilité fondée sur la confiance (2001).

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  78. See Ch. von Bar (supra fn. 7), no. 44/45 and Art. 2:207 of the Draft Articles on Tort Law (supra fn. 35).

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  79. Responses to case 10 of the Questionnaire PETL Fault; e.g. W.V.H. Rogers, England, PETL Fault, 52: “Negligent acts … are generally regarded as legal wrongs; omissions are generally not.” and the opinion of Lord Hoffmann in Stovin v. Wise quoted there.

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  80. Supra Art. 4:102 no. 8.

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  81. See Ch. von Bar (supra fn. 7), no. 195 et seq.

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  82. Infra no. 6.

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  83. See infra no. 8 and 9.

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  84. Supra no. 1 and 2 as well as fn. 62 and 67.

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  85. See supra Title II.

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  86. See B.A. Koch/ H. Koziol, Comparative Conclusions, PETL Strict Liability, no. 154 et seq.; H. Kötz/G. Wagner, Deliktsrecht (10th ed. 2004), no. 260 et seq.; see also infra Introduction to Chapter 5, no. 2.

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  87. See infra comments to Art. 5:102.

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  88. Supra Art. 4:102 no. 8 (see also 4:103 no. 3).

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  89. See the explanations for the parallel notion of “abnormal danger” infra Art. 5:101, no. 19.

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  90. B.A. Koch/ H. Koziol, Comparative Conclusions, PETL Strict Liability, no. 156.

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  91. L. Tichy, Czech Republic, PETL Fault, no. 36 et seq.

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  92. M. Martin-Casals/ J. Ribot/ J. Solé, Spain, PETL Strict Liability, no. 9 et seq.; in the same sense M. Martin-Casals/J. Solé, Spain, PETL Fault, no. 8 et seq.

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  93. See also infra: Art. 6:101 and the comments thereon.

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  94. H. Koziol, Austria, PETL Fault, no. 7; H. Cousy/D. Droshout, Belgium, PETL Fault, no. 1 and 43–44; P. Widmer, Comparative Report, PETL Fault, no. 64–65; B.A. Koch/H. Koziol, Austria, PETL Strict Liability, no. 6; H. Cousy/D. Droshout, Belgium, PETL Strict Liability, no. 9; S. Galand-Carval, France, PETL Strict Liability, no. 2; J. Fedtke/U. Magnus, Germany, PETL Strict Liability, no. 7; K. Kerameus, Greece, PETL Strict Liability, no. 1 et seq.; I. Gilead, Israel, PETL Strict Liability, no. 8; F. Busnelli/G. Comandé, Italy, PETL Strict Liability, no. 16 et seq. and 83 et seq.; E. du Perron/W. van Boom, Netherlands, PETL Strict Liability, no. 5 et seq.; P. Widmer, Switzerland, PETL Strict Liability, no. 2, 3, 6 et seq.; M. Faure, Economic Analysis, PETL Strict Liability, no. 10 et seq.; B.A. Koch/H. Koziol, Comparative Conclusions, PETL Strict Liability, no. 2 and 154 et seq.

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  95. In its practical application, however, this provision is used more like an authentic strict liability than a liability based on fault with reversed burden of proof; see F. Busnelli/ G. Comande, Italy, PETL Strict Liability, no. 46 and 85; F. Schlüchter, Haftung für gefährliche Tätigkeit (1990) 4.4.1.2, 116 et seq., 4.4.1.8.6, 164.

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  96. S. Galand-Carval, France, PETL Fault, no. 23; idem, France, PETL Strict Liability, no. 2.

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  97. The Group thereby seems to be in line with the current debate in the United States, where the “battle” between strict liability and negligence in the field of enterprise liability is currently shifting towards the fault side again: See, e.g., the leading articles by G. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 [1985] Journal of Legal Studies, 461; G. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 [1992] Georgia Law Review, 601. See also the more recent discussion of the Third Restatement, where the fault principle is reaffirmed, e.g. G. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict Liability, 54 [2001] Vanderbilt Law Review, 1285; J. Henderson, Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 [2002] UCLA Law Review, 377.

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  98. See the questionnaire in B.A. Koch/ H. Koziol (eds.), Unification of Tort Law: Strict Liability (2002, hereafter cited as PETL Strict Liability), 3.

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  99. See infra Chapter 5 no. 2–3; 5–6.

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  100. Cf. B.A. Koch, European Union, in H. Koziol/ B. Steininger (eds.), European Tort Law 2001 (2002) 473 (no. 31 et seq.); idem, European Union, in H. Koziol/B. Steininger (eds.), European Tort Law 2002 (2003) 432 (no. 55 et seq.).

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  101. COM (2000) 893 final, where the Commission e.g. admits that even after 15 years, there is “still limited experience” with the Directive (p. 28).

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  102. Proposal for a Council Directive on the Liability of Suppliers of Services, COM (1990) 482 final, Official Journal (OJ) C 12, 18.1.1991, 8.

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  103. Cf. Art. 4:102 no. 25.

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  104. See infra Art. 6:102 no. 18.

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  105. Cf. M. Faure, Economic Analysis of Strict Liability, PETL Strict Liability, 361 (no. 10 et seq.).

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  106. See, e.g., M. Martínasals/ J. Solé Feliu, Spain, in P. Widmer (ed.), Unification of Tort Law: Fault (2005, hereafter cited as PETL Fault), no. 8 et seq.; further supra Art. 4:102 no. 9; Art. 4:202 no. 8–9.

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  107. English translation according to the appendix to P. Loser-Krogh, Switzerland, in H. Koziol/ B. Steininger (eds.), European Tort Law 2002 (2003) 405 (426). The original reads as follows: “Die Person, die sich zum Betrieb einer Unternehmung mit wirtschaftlich oder beruflich ausgerichteten Tätigkeiten einer oder mehrerer Hilfspersonen bedient, haftet für den Schaden, der im Rahmen dieser Tätigkeiten verursacht wird, es sei denn, sie beweise, dass die Organisation der Unternehmung geeignet war, den Schaden zu verhüten.”

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  108. Supra at fn. 6.

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  109. See Art. 6:102 no. 6.

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  110. See also the citations supra fn. 1. Cf. M. Faure/ T. Hartlief, Towards an expanding enterprise liability in Europe? How to analyze the scope of liability of industrial operations and their insurers, [1996] Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 235.

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  111. Supra Introduction no. 2.

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  112. Cf. B.A. Koch/ H. Koziol, Comparative Conclusions, PETL Strict Liability, 395 (no. 154 et seq.).

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Busnelli, F.D. et al. (2005). Liability Based on Fault. In: Principles of European Tort Law. Springer, Vienna. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-211-27751-X_5

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