Abstract
The study of congestion games is central to the interplay between computer science and game theory. However, most work in this context does not deal with possible deviations by coalitions of players, a significant issue one may wish to consider. In order to deal with this issue we study the existence of strong and correlated strong equilibria in monotone congestion games. Our study of strong equilibrium deals with monotone-increasing congestion games, complementing the results obtained by Holzman and Law-Yone on monotone-decreasing congestion games. We then present a study of correlated-strong equilibrium for both decreasing and increasing monotone congestion games.
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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Rozenfeld, O., Tennenholtz, M. (2006). Strong and Correlated Strong Equilibria in Monotone Congestion Games. In: Spirakis, P., Mavronicolas, M., Kontogiannis, S. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4286. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11944874_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11944874_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-68138-0
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