RC4-Hash: A New Hash Function Based on RC4

  • Donghoon Chang
  • Kishan Chand Gupta
  • Mridul Nandi
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4329)


In this paper, we propose a new hash function based on RC4 and we call it RC4-Hash. This proposed hash function produces variable length hash output from 16 bytes to 64 bytes. Our RC4-Hash has several advantages over many popularly known hash functions. Its efficiency is comparable with widely used known hash function (e.g., SHA-1). Seen in the light of recent attacks on MD4, MD5, SHA-0, SHA-1 and on RIPEMD, there is a serious need to consider other hash function design strategies. We present a concrete hash function design with completely new internal structure. The security analysis of RC4-Hash can be made in the view of the security analysis of RC4 (which is well studied) as well as the attacks on different hash functions. Our hash function is very simple and rules out all possible generic attacks. To the best of our knowledge, the design criteria of our hash function is different from all previously known hash functions. We believe our hash function to be secure and will appreciate security analysis and any other comments.


Hash Function RC4 Collision Attack Preimage Attack 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Donghoon Chang
    • 1
  • Kishan Chand Gupta
    • 2
  • Mridul Nandi
    • 3
  1. 1.Center for Information Security Technologies(CIST)Korea UniversityKorea
  2. 2.Department of Combinatorics and OptimizationUniversity of WaterlooCanada
  3. 3.David R. Cheriton School of Computer ScienceUniversity of WaterlooCanada

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