Differential and Rectangle Attacks on Reduced-Round SHACAL-1

  • Jiqiang Lu
  • Jongsung Kim
  • Nathan Keller
  • Orr Dunkelman
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4329)


SHACAL-1 is an 80-round block cipher with a 160-bit block size and a key of up to 512 bits. In this paper, we mount rectangle attacks on the first 51 rounds and a series of inner 52 rounds of SHACAL-1, and also mount differential attacks on the first 49 rounds and a series of inner 55 rounds of SHACAL-1. These are the best currently known cryptanalytic results on SHACAL-1 in an one key attack scenario.


Block cipher SHACAL-1 Differential cryptanalysis Amplified boomerang attack Rectangle attack 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jiqiang Lu
    • 1
  • Jongsung Kim
    • 2
    • 3
  • Nathan Keller
    • 4
  • Orr Dunkelman
    • 5
  1. 1.Information Security Group, Royal HollowayUniversity of LondonEgham, SurreyUK
  2. 2.ESAT/SCD-COSICKatholieke Universiteit LeuvenLeuven-HeverleeBelgium
  3. 3.Center for Information Security Technologies(CIST)Korea UniversitySeoulKorea
  4. 4.Einstein Institute of MathematicsHebrew UniversityJerusalemIsrael
  5. 5.Computer Science DepartmentTechnionHaifaIsrael

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