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Efficient and Provably Secure Generic Construction of Three-Party Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols

  • Weijia Wang
  • Lei Hu
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4329)

Abstract

Three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (3-party PAKE) protocols make two communication parties establish a shared session key with the help of a trusted server, with which each of the two parties shares a predetermined password. Recently, with the first formal treatment for 3-party PAKE protocols addressed by Abdalla et al., the security of such protocols has received much attention from cryptographic protocol researchers. In this paper, we consider the security of 3-party PAKE protocols against undetectable on-line dictionary attacks which are serious and covert threats for the protocals. We examine two 3-party PAKE schemes proposed recently by Abdalla et al. and reveal their common weakness in resisting undetectable on-line dictionary attacks. With reviewing the formal model for 3-party PAKE protocols of Abdalla et al. and enhancing it by adding the authentication security notion for the treatment of undetectable attacks, we then present an efficient generic construction for 3-party PAKE protocols, and prove it enjoys both the semantic security and the authentication security.

Keywords

password authenticated key exchange key distribution multi-party protocol 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Weijia Wang
    • 1
  • Lei Hu
    • 1
  1. 1.Graduate School of Chinese Academy of SciencesState Key Laboratory of Information SecurityBeijingChina

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