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Non-cooperative Facility Location and Covering Games

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Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2006)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 4288))

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Abstract

We study a general class of non-cooperative games coming from combinatorial covering and facility location problems. A game for k players is based on an integer programming formulation. Each player wants to satisfy a subset of the constraints. Variables represent resources, which are available in costly integer units and must be bought. The cost can be shared arbitrarily between players. Once a unit is bought, it can be used by all players to satisfy their constraints. In general the cost of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this game can be prohibitively high, as both prices of anarchy and stability are in Θ(k). In addition, deciding the existence of pure Nash equilibria is NP-hard. These results extend to recently studied single-source connection games. Under certain conditions, however, cheap Nash equilibria exist: if the integrality gap of the underlying integer program is 1 and in the case of single constraint players. In addition, we present algorithms that compute cheap approximate Nash equilibria in polynomial time.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer & Information Science, Konstanz University, Germany

    Martin Hoefer

Authors
  1. Martin Hoefer
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Japan

    Tetsuo Asano

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Hoefer, M. (2006). Non-cooperative Facility Location and Covering Games. In: Asano, T. (eds) Algorithms and Computation. ISAAC 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4288. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11940128_38

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11940128_38

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-49694-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-49696-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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