Abstract
In a repurchase program, different firms can obtain different gains when they announce a stock repurchase, so a firm needs to know whether announcement is an optimal choice. This paper presents a dynamic, two-player game model with imperfect information, analyzes its further equilibrium condition. The model shows that repurchase announcements have various effects on the firms. High-earnings firms choose to make announcements, whereas low-earnings ones are inclined not to announce.Finally, it gives empirical test for the model to validate the conclusion according to the data of China.
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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Tang, W., Peng, J. (2006). The Research on Repurchase Announcements of Open-Market Stock. In: Wang, TD., et al. Simulated Evolution and Learning. SEAL 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4247. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11903697_42
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11903697_42
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-47331-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-47332-9
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)