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Auditable Privacy: On Tamper-Evident Mix Networks

  • Jong Youl Choi
  • Philippe Golle
  • Markus Jakobsson
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4107)

Abstract

We introduce the notion of tamper-evidence for mix networks in order to defend against attacks aimed at covertly leaking secret information held by corrupted mix servers. This is achieved by letting observers (which need not be trusted) verify the absence of covert channels by means of techniques we introduce herein. Our tamper-evident mix network is a type of re-encryption mixnet in which a server proves that the permutation and re-encryption factors that it uses are correctly derived from a random seed to which the server is committed.

Keywords

Mix network covert channel malware observer subliminal channel tamper-evident 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jong Youl Choi
    • 1
  • Philippe Golle
    • 2
  • Markus Jakobsson
    • 3
  1. 1.Dept. of Computer ScienceIndiana University at BloomingtonUSA
  2. 2.Palo Alto Research CenterPalo AltoUSA
  3. 3.School of InformaticsIndiana University at BloomingtonUSA

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