An Efficient Publicly Verifiable Mix-Net for Long Inputs

  • Jun Furukawa
  • Kazue Sako
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4107)


We propose here the first efficient publicly verifiable hybrid mix-net. Previous publicly verifiable mix-net was only efficient for short ciphertexts and was not suitable for mixing long messages. Previous hybrid mix-net can mix long messages but did not have public verifiability. The proposed scheme is efficient enough to treat large scale electronic questionnaires of long messages as well as voting with write-ins, and offers public verifiability of the correctness of the tally. The scheme is provably secure if we assume random oracles, semantic security of a one-time symmetric-key cryptosystem, and intractability of decision Diffie-Hellman problem.


Hybrid-mix public verifiability multiple encryption efficient 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jun Furukawa
    • 1
  • Kazue Sako
    • 1
  1. 1.NEC CorporationKawasakiJapan

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