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Conditional Encrypted Mapping and Comparing Encrypted Numbers

  • Ian F. Blake
  • Vladimir Kolesnikov
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4107)

Abstract

We consider the problem of comparing two encrypted numbers and its extension – transferring one of the two secrets, depending on the result of comparison. We show how to efficiently apply our solutions to practical settings, such as auctions with the semi-honest auctioneer, proxy selling, etc. We propose a new primitive, Conditional Encrypted Mapping, which captures common security properties of one round protocols in a variety of settings, which may be of independent interest.

Keywords

Two Millionaires with encrypted inputs auctions private selective payments conditional encrypted mapping 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ian F. Blake
    • 1
  • Vladimir Kolesnikov
    • 2
  1. 1.Dept. ECEUniversity of TorontoCanada
  2. 2.Dept. Comp. Sci.University of TorontoCanada

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