Abstract
We consider the problem of efficient key management and user revocation in cryptographic file systems that allow shared access to files. A performance-efficient solution to user revocation in such systems is lazy revocation, a method that delays the re-encryption of a file until the next write to that file. We formalize the notion of key-updating schemes for lazy revocation, an abstraction to manage cryptographic keys in file systems with lazy revocation, and give a security definition for such schemes. We give two composition methods that combine two secure key-updating schemes into a new secure scheme that permits a larger number of user revocations. We prove the security of two slightly modified existing constructions and propose a novel binary tree construction that is also provably secure in our model. Finally, we give a systematic analysis of the computational and communication complexity of the three constructions and show that the novel construction improves the previously known constructions.
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Backes, M., Cachin, C., Oprea, A. (2006). Secure Key-Updating for Lazy Revocation. In: Gollmann, D., Meier, J., Sabelfeld, A. (eds) Computer Security – ESORICS 2006. ESORICS 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4189. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11863908_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11863908_21
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