Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

A Cryptographic Framework for the Controlled Release of Certified Data

  • Conference paper
Security Protocols (Security Protocols 2004)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 3957))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

It is usually the case that before a transaction can take place, some mutual trust must be established between the participants. On-line, doing so requires the exchange of some certified information about the participants. The easy solution is to disclose one’s identity and reveal all of one’s certificates to establish such a trust relationship. However, it is clear that such an approach is unsatisfactory from a privacy point of view. In fact, often revealing any information that uniquely corresponds to a given individual is a bad idea from the privacy point of view.

In this survey paper we describe a framework where for each transaction there is a precise specification of what pieces of certified data is revealed to each participant. We show how to specify transactions in this framework, give examples of transactions that use it, and describe the cryptographic building blocks that this framework is built upon. We conclude with bibliographic notes on the state-of-the-art in this area.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Portia project, website: http://crypto.stanford.edu/portia

  2. PRIME project, website: http://www.prime-project.eu.org

  3. Asokan, N., Shoup, V., Waidner, M.: Optimistic fair exchange of digital signatures. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 18(4), 591–610 (2000)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  4. Ateniese, G., Camenisch, J.L., Joye, M., Tsudik, G.: A practical and provably secure coalition-resistant group signature scheme. In: Bellare, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2000. LNCS, vol. 1880, pp. 255–270. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  5. Barić, N., Pfitzmann, B.: Collision-free accumulators and fail-stop signature schemes without trees. In: Fumy, W. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1997. LNCS, vol. 1233, pp. 480–494. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  6. Bellare, M., Goldreich, O.: On defining proofs of knowledge. In: Brickell, E.F. (ed.) CRYPTO 1992. LNCS, vol. 740, pp. 390–420. Springer, Heidelberg (1993)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  7. Boneh, D., Franklin, M.: Identity-based encryption from the weil pairing. In: Kilian, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 2001. LNCS, vol. 2139, pp. 213–229. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  8. Boneh, D., Silverberg, A.: Applications of multilinear forms to cryptography. In: Topics in Algebraic and Noncommutative Geometry, Contemporary Mathematics, vol. 324, pp. 71–90. American Mathematical Society (2003)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Brands, S.: Untraceable off-line cash in wallets with observers. In: Stinson, D.R. (ed.) CRYPTO 1993. LNCS, vol. 773, pp. 302–318. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  10. Brands, S.: Rethinking Public Key Infrastructure and Digital Certificates— Building in Privacy. PhD thesis, Eindhoven Institute of Technology, Eindhoven, The Netherlands (1999)

    Google Scholar 

  11. Brassard, G., Chaum, D., Crépeau, C.: Minimum disclosure proofs of knowledge. Journal of Computer and System Sciences 37(2), 156–189 (1988)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  12. Brickell, E., Camenisch, J., Chen, L.: Direct anonymous attestation. Technical Report Research Report RZ 3450, IBM Research Division (March 2004)

    Google Scholar 

  13. Camenisch, J.L., Damgård, I.B.: Verifiable encryption, group encryption, and their applications to separable group signatures and signature sharing schemes. In: Okamoto, T. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1976, pp. 331–345. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  14. Camenisch, J.L., Groth, J.: Group signatures: Better efficiency and new theoretical aspects (in submission)

    Google Scholar 

  15. Camenisch, J.L., Lysyanskaya, A.: Efficient non-transferable anonymous multi-show credential system with optional anonymity revocation. Technical Report Research Report RZ 3295, IBM Research Division (November 2000)

    Google Scholar 

  16. Camenisch, J.L., Lysyanskaya, A.: Efficient non-transferable anonymous multi-show credential system with optional anonymity revocation. In: Pfitzmann, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2045, pp. 93–118. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  17. Camenisch, J.L., Lysyanskaya, A.: A signature scheme with efficient protocols. In: Cimato, S., Galdi, C., Persiano, G. (eds.) SCN 2002. LNCS, vol. 2576, pp. 268–289. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  18. Camenisch, J.L., Lysyanskaya, A.: Signature schemes and anonymous credentials from bilinear maps. In: Franklin, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2004. LNCS, vol. 3152, pp. 56–72. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  19. Camenisch, J.L., Michels, M.: A group signature scheme with improved efficiency. In: Ohta, K., Pei, D. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 1998. LNCS, vol. 1514, pp. 160–174. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  20. Camenisch, J.L., Michels, M.: Separability and efficiency for generic group signature schemes (Extended abstract). In: Wiener, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1999. LNCS, vol. 1666, pp. 413–430. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  21. Camenisch, J.L., Shoup, V.: Practical verifiable encryption and decryption of discrete logarithms. In: Boneh, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2003. LNCS, vol. 2729, pp. 126–144. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  22. Camenisch, J.L., Stadler, M.A.: Efficient group signature schemes for large groups. In: Kaliski Jr., B.S. (ed.) CRYPTO 1997. LNCS, vol. 1294, pp. 410–424. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  23. Camenisch, J.L., Van Herreweghen, E.: Technical report

    Google Scholar 

  24. Camenisch, J.L.: Group Signature Schemes and Payment Systems Based on the Discrete Logarithm Problem. PhD thesis, ETH Zürich, Diss.ETH No. 12520, Hartung Gorre Verlag, Konstanz (1998)

    Google Scholar 

  25. Chaum, D.: Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM 24(2), 84–88 (1981)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  26. Chaum, D.: Blind signatures for untraceable payments. In: Chaum, D., Rivest, R.L., Sherman, A.T. (eds.) Advances in Cryptology — Proceedings of CRYPTO 1982, pp. 199–203. Plenum Press, New York (1983)

    Google Scholar 

  27. Chaum, D.: Security without identification: Transaction systems to make big brother obsolete. Communications of the ACM 28(10), 1030–1044 (1985)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  28. Chaum, D., Evertse, J.-H.: A secure and privacy-protecting protocol for transmitting personal information between organizations. In: Odlyzko, A.M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1986. LNCS, vol. 263, pp. 118–167. Springer, Heidelberg (1987)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  29. Chaum, D., Fiat, A., Naor, M.: Untraceable electronic cash. In: Goldwasser, S. (ed.) CRYPTO 1988. LNCS, vol. 403, pp. 319–327. Springer, Heidelberg (1990)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  30. Chaum, D., van Heyst, E.: Group signatures. In: Davies, D.W. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1991. LNCS, vol. 547, pp. 257–265. Springer, Heidelberg (1991)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  31. Cramer, R., Shoup, V.: A practical public key cryptosystem provably secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. In: Krawczyk, H. (ed.) CRYPTO 1998. LNCS, vol. 1462, pp. 13–25. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  32. Cramer, R., Shoup, V.: Signature schemes based on the strong RSA assumption. In: Proc. 6th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 46–52. ACM Press, New York (1999)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  33. Damgård, I.B., Fujisaki, E.: An integer commitment scheme based on groups with hidden order. In: ASIACRYPT 2002. LNCS, vol. 2501, Springer, Heidelberg (2002)

    Google Scholar 

  34. Damgård, I.B., Koprowski, M.: Generic lower bounds for root extraction and signature schemes in general groups. In: Knudsen, L.R. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2002. LNCS, vol. 2332, pp. 256–271. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  35. Damgård, I.B.: Payment systems and credential mechanisms with provable security against abuse by individuals. In: Goldwasser, S. (ed.) CRYPTO 1988. LNCS, vol. 403, pp. 328–335. Springer, Heidelberg (1990)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  36. Fiat, A., Shamir, A.: How to prove yourself: Practical solutions to identification and signature problems. In: Odlyzko, A.M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1986. LNCS, vol. 263, pp. 186–194. Springer, Heidelberg (1987)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  37. Fujisaki, E., Okamoto, T.: Witness hiding protocols to confirm modular polynomial relations. In: The 1997 Symposium on Cryptograpy and Information Security, Fukuoka, Japan. The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communcation Engineers (January 1997), SCSI97-33D

    Google Scholar 

  38. Gentry, C., Silverberg, A.: Hierarchical ID-based cryptography. In: Zheng, Y. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2002. LNCS, vol. 2501, pp. 548–566. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  39. Goldreich, O.: Foundations of Cryptography II: Basic Applications. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2004)

    Book  MATH  Google Scholar 

  40. Goldwasser, S., Micali, S., Rackoff, C.: The knowledge complexity of interactive proof systems. In: Proc. 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 291–304 (1985)

    Google Scholar 

  41. Goldwasser, S., Micali, S., Rivest, R.: A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks. SIAM Journal on Computing 17(2), 281–308 (1988)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  42. Joux, A.: A one-round protocol for tripartite Diffie-Hellman. In: Bosma, W. (ed.) ANTS 2000. LNCS, vol. 1838, pp. 385–394. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  43. Lysyanskaya, A.: Signature schemes and applications to cryptographic protocol design. PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts (September 2002)

    Google Scholar 

  44. Lysyanskaya, A.: Signature Schemes and Applications to Cryptographic Protocol Design. PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts (September 2002)

    Google Scholar 

  45. Lysyanskaya, A., Rivest, R.L., Sahai, A., Wolf, S.: Pseudonym Systems (Extended Abstract). In: Heys, H.M., Adams, C.M. (eds.) SAC 1999. LNCS, vol. 1758, p. 184. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  46. Paillier, P.: Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree residuosity classes. In: Stern, J. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1999. LNCS, vol. 1592, pp. 223–239. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  47. Pedersen, T.P.: Non-interactive and information-theoretic secure verifiable secret sharing. In: Feigenbaum, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 1991. LNCS, vol. 576, pp. 129–140. Springer, Heidelberg (1992)

    Google Scholar 

  48. Pointcheval, D., Stern, J.: Security proofs for signature schemes. In: Maurer, U.M. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1996. LNCS, vol. 1070, pp. 387–398. Springer, Heidelberg (1996)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  49. Silverman, J.: The Arithmetic of Elliptic Curves. Springer, Heidelberg (1986)

    Book  MATH  Google Scholar 

  50. Verheul, E.R.: Self-blindable credential certificates from the weil pairing. In: Boyd, C. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2248, pp. 533–551. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. IBM Zurich Research Laboratory, Säumerstrasse 4, 8803, Rüschlikon, Switzerland

    Endre Bangerter & Jan Camenisch

  2. Computer Science Department, Brown University, Providence, RI, 02912, USA

    Anna Lysyanskaya

Authors
  1. Endre Bangerter
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Jan Camenisch
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Anna Lysyanskaya
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Department, University of Hertfordshire, UK

    Bruce Christianson

  2. Computer Systems Group, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Bruno Crispo

  3. Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA

    James A. Malcolm

  4. Microsoft Research, Cambridge, UK

    Michael Roe

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Bangerter, E., Camenisch, J., Lysyanskaya, A. (2006). A Cryptographic Framework for the Controlled Release of Certified Data. In: Christianson, B., Crispo, B., Malcolm, J.A., Roe, M. (eds) Security Protocols. Security Protocols 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3957. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11861386_4

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11861386_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-40925-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-40926-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation