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Secure Cross-Realm C2C-PAKE Protocol

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Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2006)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 4058))

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Abstract

Client-to-client password authenticated key exchange (C2C-PAKE) protocol deals with the authenticated key exchange process between two clients, who only share their passwords with their own servers. Jin Wook Byun et al. first divided this scenario into two kinds called single-server C2C-PAKE protocol and cross-realm C2C-PAKE protocol respectively. Recently, Abdalla et al. proposed a generic construction for single-server C2C-PAKE protocol and presented a concrete example with security proof. But, no similar results about cross-realm C2C-PAKE protocol exist. In fact, all existing cross-realm C2C-PAKE protocols are found insecure. To counter flaws and provide a secure cross-realm C2C-PAKE protocol, in this paper, we introduce a formal model and corresponding security definitions. Then, a new cross-realm C2C-PAKE protocol is presented with security proof.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Sciences, State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Beijing, 100049, China

    Yin Yin & Li Bao

Authors
  1. Yin Yin
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  2. Li Bao
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Information Technology, Deakin University,  

    Lynn Margaret Batten

  2. Department of Computer Science, University of Calgary, T2N 1N4, Calgary,  

    Reihaneh Safavi-Naini

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Yin, Y., Bao, L. (2006). Secure Cross-Realm C2C-PAKE Protocol. In: Batten, L.M., Safavi-Naini, R. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4058. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11780656_33

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11780656_33

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-35458-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-35459-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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