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International Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies

PET 2005: Privacy Enhancing Technologies pp 128–146Cite as

Mix-Network with Stronger Security

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 3856))

Abstract

We consider a mix-network as a cryptographic primitive that provides anonymity. A mix-network takes as input a number of ciphertexts and outputs a random shuffle of the corresponding plaintexts. Common applications of mix-nets are electronic voting and anonymous network traffic. In this paper, we present a novel construction of a mix-network, which is based on shuffling ElGamal encryptions. Our scheme is the first mix-net to meet the strongest security requirements: it is robust and secure against chosen ciphertext attacks as well as against active attacks in the Universally Composable model. Our construction allows one to securely execute several mix-net instances concurrently, as well as to run multiple mix-sessions without changing a set of keys. Nevertheless, the scheme is efficient: it requires a linear work (in the number of input messages) per mix-server.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. IBM Research, Zurich Research Laboratory, Säumerstrasse 4, CH-8803, Rüschlikon, Switzerland

    Jan Camenisch

  2. Department of Computer Science, University of California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, Dept. 0114, La Jolla, CA, 92093-0114, USA

    Anton Mityagin

Authors
  1. Jan Camenisch
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  2. Anton Mityagin
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Microsoft Research, Cambridge, UK

    George Danezis

  2. Artificial Intelligence Center, SRI International, USA

    David Martin

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Camenisch, J., Mityagin, A. (2006). Mix-Network with Stronger Security. In: Danezis, G., Martin, D. (eds) Privacy Enhancing Technologies. PET 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3856. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11767831_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11767831_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-34745-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-34746-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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