Automatic Fault Tree Derivation from Little-JIL Process Definitions

  • Bin Chen
  • George S. Avrunin
  • Lori A. Clarke
  • Leon J. Osterweil
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3966)


Defects in safety critical processes can lead to accidents that result in harm to people or damage to property. Therefore, it is important to find ways to detect and remove defects from such processes. Earlier work has shown that Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [3] can be effective in detecting safety critical process defects. Unfortunately, it is difficult to build a comprehensive set of Fault Trees for a complex process, especially if this process is not completely well-defined. The Little-JIL process definition language has been shown to be effective for defining complex processes clearly and precisely at whatever level of granularity is desired [1]. In this work, we present an algorithm for generating Fault Trees from Little-JIL process definitions. We demonstrate the value of this work by showing how FTA can identify safety defects in the process from which the Fault Trees were automatically derived.


Model Check Fault Tree Input Event Intermediate Event Process Definition 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bin Chen
    • 1
  • George S. Avrunin
    • 1
  • Lori A. Clarke
    • 1
  • Leon J. Osterweil
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of MassachusettsAmherstUSA

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