Abstract
In cryptography we typically prove the security of a scheme by reducing the task of breaking the scheme to some hard computational problem. This reduction usually done in a black-box fashion. By this we mean that there is an algorithm that can solve the hard problem given any black-box for breaking the scheme.
This lecture concerns exceptions to this rule: that is, schemes that are proven secure using a non-black-box reduction, that actually uses the code of a scheme-breaking attacker to construct a problem-solving algorithm. It turns out that such reductions can be used to obtain schemes with better properties that were known before. In fact, in some cases these non-black-box reductions can be obtain goals that were proven to be impossible to achieve when restricting to black-box reductions. In particular, we will present constructions of zero-knowledge protocols that are proven secure under various compositions [1, 2, 3] .
We’ll also discuss some of the limitations and open questions regarding non-black-box security proofs.
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Barak, B.: How to go beyond the black-box simulation barrier. In: Proc. 42nd FOCS, pp. 106–115. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2001)
Pass, R.: Bounded-concurrent secure multi-party computation with a dishonest majority. In: Proc. 36th STOC, pp. 232–241. ACM, New York (2004)
Barak, B., Sahai, A.: How to play almost any mental game over the net - concurrent composition using super-polynomial simulation. In: Proc. 46th FOCS. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2005)
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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Barak, B. (2006). Non-black-box Techniques in Cryptography. In: Grigoriev, D., Harrison, J., Hirsch, E.A. (eds) Computer Science – Theory and Applications. CSR 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3967. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11753728_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11753728_1
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