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A Separation Between Selective and Full-Identity Security Notions for Identity-Based Encryption

  • David Galindo
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3982)

Abstract

Identity-based encryption has attracted a lot of attention since the publication of the scheme by Boneh and Franklin. In this work we compare the two adversarial models previously considered in the literature, namely the full and selective-identity models. Remarkably, we show that the strongest security level with respect to selective-identity attacks (i.e. chosen-ciphertext security) fails to imply the weakest full-identity security level (i.e. one-wayness). In addition, an analogous result for the related primitive of tag-based encryption is presented.

Keywords

Foundations identity-based encryption tag-based encryption 

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • David Galindo
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute for Computing and Information SciencesRadboud University NijmegenNijmegenThe Netherlands

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