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Relative Doubling Attack Against Montgomery Ladder

  • Sung-Ming Yen
  • Lee-Chun Ko
  • SangJae Moon
  • JaeCheol Ha
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3935)

Abstract

Highly regular execution and the cleverly included redundant computation make the square-multiply-always exponentiation algorithm well known as a good countermeasure against the conventional simple power analysis (SPA). However, the doubling attack threatens the square-multiply-always exponentiation by fully exploiting the existence of such redundant computation. The Montgomery ladder is also recognized as a good countermeasure against the conventional SPA due to its highly regular execution. Most importantly, no redundant computation is introduced into the Montgomery ladder. In this paper, immunity of the Montgomery ladder against the doubling attack is investigated. One straightforward result is that the Montgomery ladder can be free from the original doubling attack. However, a non-trivial result obtained in this research is that a relative doubling attack proposed in this paper threatens the Montgomery ladder. The proposed relative doubling attack uses a totally different approach to derive the private key in which the relationship between two adjacent private key bits can be obtained as either d i =d i − − 1 or \(d_i \ne d_{i-1}\). Finally, a remark is given to the problem of whether the upward (right-to-left) regular exponentiation algorithm is necessary against the original doubling attack and the proposed relative doubling attack.

Keywords

Chosen-message attack Cryptography Doubling attack Exponentiation Scalar multiplication Side-channel attack Simple power analysis (SPA) Smart card 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sung-Ming Yen
    • 1
  • Lee-Chun Ko
    • 1
  • SangJae Moon
    • 2
  • JaeCheol Ha
    • 3
  1. 1.Laboratory of Cryptography and Information Security (LCIS), Dept of Computer Science and Information EngineeringNational Central UniversityChung-LiTaiwan, R.O.C.
  2. 2.School of Electronic and Electrical EngineeringKyungpook National UniversityTaeguKorea
  3. 3.Dept of Computer and InformationKorea Nazarene UniversityChoong NamKorea

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