Abstract
We consider an individualised approach to agent behaviour in an application to the classical economic problem of tax compliance. Most economic theories consider homogeneous representative agent utilitarian approaches to explain the decision of complying or not with tax payment. However, a heterogeneous and individualised account of decision can be considered to explain certain apparently irrational behaviours. Ideas such as trust and peer perception may have a key influence in individual decisions, and thus transform the global results for society. In this paper, we apply the agent view of rationality to economic decisions and define a territory to be explored by agent technology and social simulations. We conclude that the multi-agent view can provide powerful results which might lead to significant economic policy implications.
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Antunes, L., Balsa, J., Urbano, P., Moniz, L., Roseta-Palma, C. (2006). Tax Compliance in a Simulated Heterogeneous Multi-agent Society. In: Sichman, J.S., Antunes, L. (eds) Multi-Agent-Based Simulation VI. MABS 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3891. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11734680_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11734680_11
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-33380-7
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