Securing Information Gateways with Derivation-Constrained Access Control

  • Urs Hengartner
  • Peter Steenkiste
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3934)


In pervasive computing environments, information gateways derive specific information, such as a person’s location, from raw data provided by a service, such as a videostream offered by a camera. Here, access control to confidential raw data provided by a service becomes difficult when a client does not have access rights to this data. For example, a client might have access to a person’s location information, but not to the videostream from which a gateway derives this information. Simply granting access rights to a gateway will allow an intruder into the gateway to access any raw data that the gateway can access. We present the concept of derivation-constrained access control, which requires a gateway to prove to a service that the gateway needs requested raw data to answer a client’s authorized request for derived information. Therefore, an intruder into the gateway will be limited in its capabilities. We provide a formal framework for derivation-constrained access control based on Lampson et al.’s “speaks-for” relationship. We demonstrate feasibility of our design with a sample implementation and a performance evaluation.


Access Control Location Information Location Service Access Control Model Subject Information 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Urs Hengartner
    • 1
  • Peter Steenkiste
    • 2
  1. 1.University of WaterlooCanada
  2. 2.Carnegie Mellon UniversityUSA

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