Abstract
In this paper, some observations on Camellia are presented, by which the Square attack and the Collision attack are improved. 11-round 256-bit Camellia without FL function is breakable with complexity of 2250 encryptions. 9-round 128-bit Camellia without FL function is breakable with the complexity of 290 encryptions. And 10-round 256-bit Camellia with FL function is breakable with the complexity of 2210 encryptions and 9-round 128-bit Camellia with FL function is breakable with the complexity of 2122 encryptions. These results are better than any other known results. It concludes that the most efficient attack on Camellia is Square attack.
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Lei, D., Chao, L., Feng, K. (2006). New Observation on Camellia. In: Preneel, B., Tavares, S. (eds) Selected Areas in Cryptography. SAC 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3897. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11693383_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11693383_4
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