Abstract
This paper shows that the standard security notion for identity based encryption schemes ( \({\mathcal IBE}\)), that is IND-ID-CCA2, captures the essence of security for all \({\mathcal IBE}\) schemes. To achieve this intention, we first describe formal definitions of the notions of security for \({\mathcal IBE}\), and then present the relations among OW, IND, SS and NM in \({\mathcal IBE}\), along with rigorous proofs. With the aim of comprehensiveness, notions of security for \({\mathcal IBE}\) in the context of encryption of multiple messages and/or to multiple receivers are finally presented. All of these results are proposed with the consideration of the particular attack in \({\mathcal IBE}\), namely the adaptive chosen identity attack.
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Attrapadung, N. et al. (2006). Relations Among Notions of Security for Identity Based Encryption Schemes. In: Correa, J.R., Hevia, A., Kiwi, M. (eds) LATIN 2006: Theoretical Informatics. LATIN 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3887. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11682462_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11682462_16
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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