Abstract
This paper addresses the problem of constructing voting protocols that are hard to manipulate. We describe a general technique for obtaining a new protocol by combining two or more base protocols, and study the resulting class of (vote-once) hybrid voting protocols, which also includes most previously known manipulation-resistant protocols. We show that for many choices of underlying base protocols, including some that are easily manipulable, their hybrids are NP-hard to manipulate, and demonstrate that this method can be used to produce manipulation-resistant protocols with unique combinations of useful features.
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Elkind, E., Lipmaa, H. (2005). Hybrid Voting Protocols and Hardness of Manipulation. In: Deng, X., Du, DZ. (eds) Algorithms and Computation. ISAAC 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3827. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11602613_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11602613_22
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30935-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32426-3
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