Skip to main content

Club Formation by Rational Sharing: Content, Viability and Community Structure

  • Conference paper
  • 1931 Accesses

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 3828))

Abstract

A sharing community prospers when participation and contribution are both high. We suggest the two, while being related decisions every peer makes, should be given separate rational bases. Considered as such, a basic issue is the viability of club formation, which necessitates the modelling of two major sources of heterogeneity, namely, peers and shared content. This viability perspective clearly explains why rational peers contribute (or free-ride when they don’t) and how their collective action determines viability as well as the size of the club formed. It also exposes another fundamental source of limitation to club formation apart from free-riding, in the community structure in terms of the relation between peers’ interest (demand) and sharing (supply).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Adar, E., Huberman, B.: Free riding on gnutella. First Monday 5 (September 2000)

    Google Scholar 

  2. “Kazaa”, http://www.kazaa.com/

  3. “Gnutella”, http://www.gnutella.com/

  4. Feldman, M., Papadimitriou, C., Chuang, J., Stoica, I.: Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems. In: Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Practice and Theory of Incentives in Networked Systems (2004)

    Google Scholar 

  5. Krishnan, R., Smith, M.D., Tang, Z., Telang, R.: The virtual commons: Why free-riding can be tolerated in file sharing networks. In: Proceedings of International Conference on Information Systems (2002)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Ng, W.-Y., Lin, W.K., Chiu, D.M.: Statistical modelling of information sharing: community, membership and content. Performance Evaluation 62(1-4), 17–31 (2005)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Varian, H.R.: The social cost of sharing. In: Proceedings of Workshop on Economics of P2P Systems (June 2003)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Benkler, Y.: Sharing nicely: on shareable goods and the emergence of sharing as a modality of economic production. The Yale Law Journal 114, 273–358 (2004)

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Ng, W.Y., Chiu, D.M., Lin, W.K. (2005). Club Formation by Rational Sharing: Content, Viability and Community Structure. In: Deng, X., Ye, Y. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3828. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_17

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_17

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30900-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32293-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics