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Pairing-Based Provable Blind Signature Scheme Without Random Oracles

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 3802))

Abstract

Blind signature allows the user to obtain a signature of a message in a way that the signer learns neither the message nor the resulting signature. Recently a lot of signature or encryption schemes are provably secure with random oracle, which could not lead to a cryptographic scheme secure in the standard model. Therefore designing efficient schemes provably secure in the standard model is a central line of modern cryptography. Followed this line, we proposed an efficiently blind signature without using hash function. Based on the complexity of q-SDH problem, we present strict proof of security against one more forgery under adaptive chosen message attack in the standard model. A full blind testimony demonstrates that our scheme bear blind property. Compared with other blind signature schemes, we think proposed scheme is more efficient. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first blind signature scheme from pairings proved secure in the standard model.

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Liao, J., Qi, Y., Huang, P., Rong, M. (2005). Pairing-Based Provable Blind Signature Scheme Without Random Oracles. In: Hao, Y., et al. Computational Intelligence and Security. CIS 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3802. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11596981_24

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11596981_24

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30819-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31598-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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