Skip to main content

On the Security of Some Password-Based Key Agreement Schemes

  • Conference paper

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 3802))

Abstract

In this paper we show that three potential security vulnerabilities exist in the strong password-only authenticated key exchange scheme due to Jablon. Two standardised schemes based on Jablon’s scheme, namely the first password-based key agreement mechanism in ISO/IEC FCD 11770-4 and the scheme BPKAS-SPEKE in IEEE P1363.2 also suffer from some of these security vulnerabilities. We further show that other password-based key agreement mechanisms, including those in ISO/IEC FCD 11770-4 and IEEE P1363.2, also suffer from these security vulnerabilities. Finally, we propose means to remove these security vulnerabilities.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   169.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Bellovin, S., Merritt, M.: Encrypted Key Exchange: Password-Based Protocols Secure Against Dictionary Attacks. In: SP 1992: Proceedings of the 1992 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 72–84. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos (1992)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  2. Jablon, D.: Strong Password-Only Authenticated Key Exchange. Computer Communication Review 26, 5–26 (1996)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Jablon, D.: Extended Password Key Exchange Protocols Immune to Dictionary Attack. In: Proceedings of the WETICE 1997 Workshop on Enterprise Security, pp. 248–255 (1997)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Bellare, M., Pointcheval, D., Rogaway, P.: Authenticated Key Exchange Secure against Dictionary Attacks. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1807, pp. 139–155. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  5. Abdalla, M., Chevassut, O., Pointcheval, D.: One-Time Verifier-Based Encrypted Key Exchange. In: Vaudenay, S. (ed.) PKC 2005. LNCS, vol. 3386, pp. 47–64. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  6. International Organization for Standardization. ISO/IEC FCD 11770–4, Information technology — Security techniques — Key management — Part 4: Mechanisms based on weak secrets (2004)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. IEEE P1363.2 draft D20, Standard Specifications for Password-Based Public-Key Cryptographic Techniques (2005)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Lomas, T., Gong, L., Saltzer, J., Needham, R.: Reducing risks from poorly chosen keys. ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review 23, 14–18 (1989)

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Tang, Q., Mitchell, C.J. (2005). On the Security of Some Password-Based Key Agreement Schemes. In: Hao, Y., et al. Computational Intelligence and Security. CIS 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3802. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11596981_22

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11596981_22

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30819-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31598-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics