Abstract
We introduce the first El Gamal based mix-net in which each mix-server partially decrypts and permutes its input, i.e., no re-encryption is necessary. An interesting property of the construction is that a sender can verify non-interactively that its message is processed correctly. We call this sender verifiability.
The mix-net is provably UC-secure against static adversaries corrupting any minority of the mix-servers. The result holds under the decision Diffie-Hellman assumption, and assuming an ideal bulletin board and an ideal zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of a correct shuffle.
Then we construct the first proof of a decryption-permutation shuffle, and show how this can be transformed into a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge in the UC-framework. The protocol is sound under the strong RSA-assumption and the discrete logarithm assumption.
Our proof of a shuffle is not a variation of existing methods. It is based on a novel idea of independent interest, and we argue that it is at least as efficient as previous constructions.
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Keywords
- Security Parameter
- Secret Sharing Scheme
- Internal Randomness
- Ideal Functionality
- Cryptology ePrint Archive
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Wikström, D. (2005). A Sender Verifiable Mix-Net and a New Proof of a Shuffle. In: Roy, B. (eds) Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2005. ASIACRYPT 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3788. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11593447_15
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