Skip to main content

A Practical Formal Model for Safety Analysis in Capability-Based Systems

  • Conference paper
Trustworthy Global Computing (TGC 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 3705))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

We present a formal system that models programmable abstractions for access control. Composite abstractions and patterns of arbitrary complexity are modeled as a configuration of communicating subjects. The subjects in the model can express behavior that corresponds to how information and authority are propagated in capability systems.

The formalism is designed to be useful for analyzing how information and authority are confined in arbitrary configurations, but it will also be useful in the reverse sense, to calculate the necessary restrictions in a subject’s behavior when a global confinement policy is given.

We introduce a subclass of these systems we call ”saturated”, that can provide safe and tractable approximations for the safety properties in arbitrary configurations of collaborating entities.

An erratum to this chapter can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11580850_20 .

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Boebert, W.E.: On the inability of an unmodified capability machine to enforce the *-property. In: Proceedings of 7th DoD/NBS Computer Security Conference, September 1984, pp. 45–54 (1984), http://zesty.ca/capmyths/boebert.html

  2. Bishop, M., Snyder, L.: The transfer of information and authority in a protection system. In: Proceedings of the seventh ACM symposium on Operating systems principles, pp. 45–54. ACM Press, New York (1979)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Dennis, J.B., Van Horn, E.C.: Programming semantics for multiprogrammed computations. Technical Report MIT/LCS/TR-23, M.I.T. Laboratory for Computer Science (1965)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Frank, J., Bishop, M.: Extending the take-grant protection system (December 1996), Available at: http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/frank96extending.html

  5. Hardy, N.: The confused deputy. ACM SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev 22(4), 36–38 (1989), http://www.cap-lore.com/CapTheory/ConfusedDeputy.html

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  6. Holzmann, G.J.: The model checker spin. IEEE Trans. Softw. Eng. 23(5), 279–295 (1997)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  7. Harrison, M.A., Ruzzo, W.L., Ullman, J.D.: Protection in operating systems. Commun. ACM 19(8), 461–471 (1976)

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  8. Salzer, J.H., Schroeder, M.D.: The protection of information in computer systems. In: Fourth ACM Symposium on Operating System Principles (March 1973)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Jürjens, J.: Secure Systems Development with UML. Springer, Berlin (2005)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  10. Guttman, J.D., Herzog, J.C., Ramsdell, J.D., Sniffen, B.T.: Programming cryptographic protocols. Technical report, The MITRE Corporation. Availalbe, at http://www.ccs.neu.edu/home/guttman/

  11. Kain, R.Y., Landwehr, C.E.: On access checking in capability-based systems. IEEE Trans. Softw. Eng. 13(2), 202–207 (1987)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  12. Lipton, R.J., Snyder, L.: A linear time algorithm for deciding subject security. J. ACM 24(3), 455–464 (1977)

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  13. Miller, M.S., Shapiro, J.: Paradigm regained: Abstraction mechanisms for access control. In: Saraswat, V.A. (ed.) ASIAN 2003. LNCS, vol. 2896, pp. 224–242. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  14. Miller, M., Stiegler, M., Close, T., Frantz, B., Yee, K.-P., Morningstar, C., Shapiro, J., Hardy, N., Tribble, E.D., Barnes, D., Bornstien, D., Wilcox-O’Hearn, B., Stanley, T., Reid, K., Bacon, D.: E: Open source distributed capabilities (2001), Available at http://www.erights.org

  15. Miller, M.S., Tulloh, B., Shapiro, J.S.: The structure of authority: Why security is not a separable concern. In: Van Roy, P. (ed.) MOZ 2004. LNCS, vol. 3389, pp. 2–20. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  16. Nielsen, M., Palamidessi, C., Valencia, F.D.: Temporal concurrent constraint programming: denotation, logic and applications. Nordic J. of Computing 9(2), 145–188 (2002)

    MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  17. Quesada, L., Van Roy, P., Deville, Y.: The reachability propagator. Research Report INFO-2005-07, Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium (2005)

    Google Scholar 

  18. Reich, S.: Escape from mutlithreaded hell. concurrency in the language “e” (March 2003), Presentation available at: http://www.drjava.de/e-presentation/html-english/img0.html

  19. Saraswat, V.A.: Concurrent Constraint Programming. MIT Press, Cambridge (1993)

    Google Scholar 

  20. Saraswat, V.A., Jagadeesan, R., Gupta, V.: Default timed concurrent constraint programming. In: POPL 1995: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages, pp. 272–285. ACM Press, New York (1995)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  21. Spiessens, F., Miller, M., Van Roy, P., Shapiro, J.: Authority Reduction in Protection Systems. Available at (2004), http://www.info.ucl.ac.be/people/fsp/ARS.pdf

  22. Spiessens, F., Van Roy, P.: The oz-E project: Design guidelines for a secure multiparadigm programming language. In: Van Roy, P. (ed.) MOZ 2004. LNCS, vol. 3389, pp. 21–40. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  23. Spiessens, F., Van Roy, P.: A practical formal model for safety analysis in Capability-Based systems. LNCS. Springer, Heidelberg (2005) Available at http://www.info.ucl.ac.be/people/fsp/tgc/tgc05fs.pdf , Presentation available at http://www.info.ucl.ac.be/people/fsp/auredsysfinal.mov

    Google Scholar 

  24. Van Roy, P., Haridi, S.: Concepts, Techniques, and Models of Computer Programming. MIT Press, Cambridge (2004)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Spiessens, F., Van Roy, P. (2005). A Practical Formal Model for Safety Analysis in Capability-Based Systems. In: De Nicola, R., Sangiorgi, D. (eds) Trustworthy Global Computing. TGC 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3705. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11580850_14

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11580850_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30007-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31483-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics