Advertisement

Intrusion Tolerant CA Scheme with Cheaters Detection Ability

  • Liwu Zhang
  • Dengguo Feng
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3759)

Abstract

In this paper, we put forward a practical intrusion tolerant CA scheme with the ability of cheater detection. Compared to the scheme of ITTC’s project[1], the scheme has built-in ability of detecting cheaters, and has ability to generate signature without specifying one group of servers in the serial mode. We also present shares proactive refresh protocol to prevent key shares from gradually exposed or corrupted. Our scheme can be changed from (t,n) scheme to (t,n + 1) scheme.

Keywords

Intrusion Tolerance Threshold Signature CA Proactive 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Wu, T., Malkin, M., Boneh, D.: Building Intrusion Tolerant Applications. In: The 8th USENIX Security Symposium, August 23-24 (1999)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Malkin, M., Wu, T., Boneh, D.: Experimenting With Shared Generation of RSA keys. In: Proceedings of the Internet Society’s 1999 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security, pp. 43–56 (1999)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Boneh, D., Durfee, G., Frankel, Y.: Exposing an RSA Private Key Given a Small Fraction of its Bits. In: ASIACRYPT 1998. LNCS, vol. 1514, pp. 25–34. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Rabin, T.: A Simplified Approach to Threshold and Proactive RSA. In: Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology. LNCS, pp. 89–104. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Fouque, P.-A., Stern, J.: Fully distributed RSA under standard assumptions. In: Boyd, C. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2248, pp. 310–330. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Benaloh, J.C., Leichter, J.: Generalized secret sharing and monotone functions. In: Goldwasser, S. (ed.) CRYPTO 1988. LNCS, vol. 403, pp. 27–35. Springer, Heidelberg (1990)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Shamir, A.: How to share a secret. Communications of ACM 22(11), 612–613 (1979)zbMATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    Shoup, V.: Practical threshold signatures. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1807, pp. 207–220. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Frankel, Y., MacKenzie, P.D., Yung, M.: Robust Efficient Distributed RSA-Key Generation. In: The Thirteenth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing – STOC 1998 (1998)Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Herzberg, A., Jakobsson, M., Jarecki, S., Krawczyk, H., Yung, M.: Proactive Public Key and Signature Systems. In: ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (1996)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Liwu Zhang
    • 1
  • Dengguo Feng
    • 1
  1. 1.State Key Laboratory of Information Security(Institute of Software of Chinese Academy of Sciences)BeijingP. R. China

Personalised recommendations