Abstract
Negotiations are an important way of reaching agreements between selfish autonomous agents. In this paper we focus on one-to-many bargaining within the context of agent-mediated electronic commerce. We consider an approach where a seller negotiates over multiple interdependent attributes with many buyers individually. Bargaining is conducted in a bilateral fashion, using an alternating-offers protocol. In such a one-to-many setting, “fairness,” which corresponds to the notion of envy-freeness in auctions, may be an important business constraint. For the case of virtually unlimited supply (such as information goods), we present a number of one-to-many bargaining strategies for the seller, which take into account the fairness constraint, and consider multiple attributes simultaneously. We compare the performance of the bargaining strategies using an evolutionary simulation, especially for the case of impatient buyers and small premature bargaining break off probability. Several of the developed strategies are able to extract almost all the surplus; they utilize the fact that the setting is one-to-many, even though bargaining occurs in a bilateral fashion.
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Gerding, E.H., Somefun, D.J.A., La Poutré, J.A.H. (2006). Multi-attribute Bilateral Bargaining in a One-to-Many Setting. In: Faratin, P., Rodríguez-Aguilar, J.A. (eds) Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI. Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems. AMEC 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3435. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11575726_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11575726_10
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