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On the Rôle of Abstract Non-interference in Language-Based Security

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Programming Languages and Systems (APLAS 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNPSE,volume 3780))

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Abstract

In this paper, we illustrate the rôle of the notion of Abstract Non-Interference in language based security, by explaining how it models both the weakening of attackers’ observational capability, and the declassification of private information. Namely, we show that in abstract non-interference we model both attackers that can only observe properties of public data, and private properties that can or cannot flow. Moreover, we deepen the understanding of abstract non-interference by comparing it, by means of examples, with some the most interesting approaches to the weakening of non-interference, such as the PER model, robust declassification, delimited release and relaxed non-interference.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computing and Information Sciences – Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, USA

    Isabella Mastroeni

Authors
  1. Isabella Mastroeni
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Seoul National University, Korea

    Kwangkeun Yi

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Mastroeni, I. (2005). On the Rôle of Abstract Non-interference in Language-Based Security. In: Yi, K. (eds) Programming Languages and Systems. APLAS 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3780. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11575467_27

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11575467_27

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-29735-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32247-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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