Abstract
We model a simple problem in advertising as a strategic timing game, and consider continuous and discrete versions of this game. For the continuous game, we completely characterize the Nash equilibrium for two players. For the discrete game, we give an efficient algorithm to compute the Nash equilibrium for n players.
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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Lotker, Z., Patt-Shamir, B., Tuttle, M.R. (2005). Timing Games and Shared Memory. In: Fraigniaud, P. (eds) Distributed Computing. DISC 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3724. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11561927_44
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11561927_44
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-29163-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32075-3
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