Abstract
This paper expands the notion of a KEM–DEM hybrid encryption scheme to the signcryption setting by introducing the notion of a signcryption KEM, a signcryption DEM and a hybrid signcryption scheme. We present the security criteria that a signcryption KEM and DEM must satisfy in order that the overall signcryption scheme is secure against outsider attacks. We also present ECISS–KEM — a simple, efficient and provably secure example of a signcryption KEM. Lastly, we briefly discuss the problems associated with using KEMs in key establishment protocols.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Abdalla, M., Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: DHAES: An encryption scheme based on the Diffie-Hellman problem. Submission to P1363a: Standard Specifications for Public-Key Cryptography, Additional Techniques (2000)
An, J.H.: Authenticated encryption in the public-key setting: Security notions and analyses (2001), Available from http://eprint.iacr.org/2001/079
An, J.H., Dodis, Y., Rabin, T.: On the security of joint signature and encryption. In: Knudsen, L.R. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2002. LNCS, vol. 2332, pp. 83–107. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Bellare, M., Desai, A., Jokipii, E., Rogaway, P.: A concrete security treatment of symmetric encryption. In: Proceedings of the 38th Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, IEEE, Los Alamitos (1997)
Bellare, M., Namprempre, C.: Authenticated encryption: Relations among notions and analysis of the generic composition paradigm. In: Okamoto, T. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1976, pp. 531–545. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Bellare, M., Rogaway, P., Wagner, D.: The EAX mode of operation. In: Roy, B., Meier, W. (eds.) FSE 2004. LNCS, vol. 3017, pp. 391–408. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Boyd, C., Mathuria, A.: Protocols for Authentication and Key Establishment. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Cramer, R., Shoup, V.: Design and analysis of practical public-key encryption schemes secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. SIAM Journal on Computing 33(1), 167–226 (2004)
Dent, A.W.: Hybrid signcryption schemes with insider security (2004), Available from http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~alex/
Dodis, Y., Freedman, M.J., Jarecki, S., Walfish, S.: Optimal signcryption from any trapdoor permutation (2004), Available from http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/020/
International Organization for Standardization. ISO/IEC 11770–3, Information technology — Security techniques — Key Management — Part 3: Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques (1999)
International Organization for Standardization. ISO/IEC CD 18033–2, Information technology — Security techniques — Encryption Algorithms — Part 2: Asymmetric Ciphers (2003)
Koblitz, N., Menezes, A.J.: Another look at provable security (2004), Available from http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/152/
Malone-Lee, J.: Signcryption with non-interactive non-repudiation. Technical Report CSTR-02-004, Department of Computer Science, University of Bristol (May 2004)
Rogaway, P., Bellare, M., Black, J., Krovetz, T.: OCB: A block-cipher mode of operation for efficient authenticated encryption. In: Proceedings of the Eighth ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS-8), pp. 196–205. ACM Press, New York (2001)
Shoup, V.: Using hash functions as a hedge against chosen ciphertext attack. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1807, pp. 275–288. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Zheng, Y.: Digital signcryption or how to achieve cost(signature & encryption) < < cost(signature) + cost(encryption). In: Kaliski Jr., B.S. (ed.) CRYPTO 1997. LNCS, vol. 1294, pp. 165–179. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Dent, A.W. (2005). Hybrid Signcryption Schemes with Outsider Security. In: Zhou, J., Lopez, J., Deng, R.H., Bao, F. (eds) Information Security. ISC 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3650. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11556992_15
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11556992_15
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-29001-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31930-6
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)