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On Obligations

  • Manuel Hilty
  • David Basin
  • Alexander Pretschner
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3679)

Abstract

Access control is concerned with granting access to sensitive data based on conditions that relate to the past or present, so-called provisions. Expressing requirements from the domain of data protection necessitates extending this notion with conditions that relate to the future. Obligations, in this sense, are concerned with commitments of the involved parties. At the moment of granting access, adherence to these commitments cannot be guaranteed. An example is the requirement “do not re-distribute data”, where the actions of the involved parties may not even be observable. We provide a formal framework that allows us to precisely specify data protection policies. A syntactic classification of formulas gives rise to natural and intuitive formal definitions of provisions and obligations. Based on this classification, we present different mechanisms for checking adherence to agreed upon commitments.

Keywords

Access Control Data Protection Policy Language Linear Temporal Logic Data Owner 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Manuel Hilty
    • 1
  • David Basin
    • 1
  • Alexander Pretschner
    • 1
  1. 1.Information SecurityETH ZürichSwitzerland

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