Advertisement

Sybil-Resistant DHT Routing

  • George Danezis
  • Chris Lesniewski-Laas
  • M. Frans Kaashoek
  • Ross Anderson
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3679)

Abstract

Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) are very efficient distributed systems for routing, but at the same time vulnerable to disruptive nodes. Designers of such systems want them used in open networks, where an adversary can perform a sybil attack by introducing a large number of corrupt nodes in the network, considerably degrading its performance. We introduce a routing strategy that alleviates some of the effects of such an attack by making sure that lookups are performed using a diverse set of nodes. This ensures that at least some of the nodes queried are good, and hence the search makes forward progress. This strategy makes use of latent social information present in the introduction graph of the network.

Keywords

Target Node Malicious Node Distribute Hash Table Candidate Node Good Node 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. 1.
    Aura, T., Nagarajan, A., Gurtov, A.: Analysis of the HIP base exchange protocol. In: Boyd, C., González Nieto, J.M. (eds.) ACISP 2005. LNCS, vol. 3574, pp. 481–493. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Castro, M., Druschel, P., Ganesh, A., Rowstron, A., Wallach, D.S.: Secure routing for structured peer-to-peer overlay networks. In: 5th Usenix Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation, Boston, MA (December 2002)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Douceur, J.R.: The sybil attack. In: Druschel, P., Kaashoek, M.F., Rowstron, A. (eds.) IPTPS 2002. LNCS, vol. 2429, p. 251. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Kleinberg, J.: The small-world phenomenon: An algorithmic perspective. In: 32nd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (2000)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Levien, R.: Attack resistant trust metrics. Draft Ph.D. Thesis, at U.C. BerkeleyGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Li, J., Stribling, J., Gil, T.M., Morris, R., Kaashoek, M.F.: Comparing the performance of distributed hash tables under churn. In: Voelker, G.M., Shenker, S. (eds.) IPTPS 2004. LNCS, vol. 3279, pp. 87–99. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Marti, S., Ganesan, P., Garcia-Molina, H.: SPROUT: P2P routing with social networks. In: First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer and Databases (P2P&DB 2004) (March 2004)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Maziéres, D.: Self-certifying file system. PhD thesis, MIT (May 2000)Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Needham, R.M.: Denial of service: an example. Communications of the ACM 37(11), 42–46 (1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Ratnasamy, S., Francis, P., Handley, M., Karp, R., Shenker, S.: A scalable content-addressable network. In: Proc. ACM SIGCOMM 2001, San Diego, California (August 2001)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Rhea, S., Geels, D., Roscoe, T., Kubiatowicz, J.: Handling churn in a dht. In: USENIX Annual Technical Conference (June 2004)Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Rowstron, A., Druschel, P.: Pastry: Scalable, distributed object location and routing for large-scale peer-to-peer systems. Heidelberg, Germany (2001)Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Sit, E., Morris, R.: Security considerations for peer-to-peer distributed hash tables. In: Druschel, P., Kaashoek, M.F., Rowstron, A. (eds.) IPTPS 2002. LNCS, vol. 2429, p. 261. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. 14.
    Stoica, I., Morris, R., Karger, D., Frans Kaashoek, M., Balakrishnan, H.: Chord: A scalable peer-to-peer lookup service for internet applications. In: Proc. ACM SIGCOMM 2001, San Diego, California (August 2001)Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Zhao, B.Y., Kubiatowicz, J.D., Joseph, A.D.: Tapestry: An infrastructure for fault-resilient wide-area location and routing. Technical Report UCB//CSD-01-1141, U. C. Berkeley (April 2001)Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Ziegler, C.-N., Lausen, G.: Spreading activation models for trust propagation. In: IEEE International Conference on e-Technology, e-Commerce, and e-Service (EEE 2004), Taipei, Taiwan, March 29-31 (2004)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • George Danezis
    • 1
  • Chris Lesniewski-Laas
    • 2
  • M. Frans Kaashoek
    • 2
  • Ross Anderson
    • 1
  1. 1.Computer LaboratoryUniversity of CambridgeCambridgeUnited Kingdom
  2. 2.MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence LaboratoryCambridgeUSA

Personalised recommendations