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Installing Fake Root Keys in a PC

  • Adil Alsaid
  • Chris J. Mitchell
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3545)

Abstract

If a malicious party can insert a self-issued CA public key into the list of root public keys stored in a PC, then this party could potentially do considerable harm to that PC . In this paper, we present a way to achieve such an attack for the Internet Explorer web browser root key store, which avoids attracting the user’s attention. A realisation of this attack is also described. Finally, countermeasures that can be deployed to prevent such an attack are outlined.

Keywords

Malicious Code Creation Tool Malicious Party Monitoring Thread False Root 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Adil Alsaid
    • 1
  • Chris J. Mitchell
    • 1
  1. 1.Information Security Group, Royal HollowayUniversity of London EghamSurrey

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