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A Lower-Bound of Complexity for RSA-Based Password-Authenticated Key Exchange

  • SeongHan Shin
  • Kazukuni Kobara
  • Hideki Imai
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3545)

Abstract

Some RSA-based PAKE protocols have been proposed using a challenge-response method for verifying the validity of the server’s RSA public key due to the lack of a PKI. However, these kind of RSA-based PAKE protocols cannot specify the exact overall complexity of their protocols since there exists a system parameter l needed for the challenge-response method. In this paper we present an RSA-based PAKE (RSA-PAKE) protocol, followed by its lower-bound of complexity and the actual computation and communication costs.

Keywords

Random Oracle Model Dictionary Attack Perfect Forward Secrecy Correct Password PAKE Protocol 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • SeongHan Shin
    • 1
  • Kazukuni Kobara
    • 1
  • Hideki Imai
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of Industrial ScienceThe University of TokyoTokyoJapan

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