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A Tree Based One-Key Broadcast Encryption Scheme with Low Computational Overhead

  • Tomoyuki Asano
  • Kazuya Kamio
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3574)

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a new broadcast encryption method which is a modification of the Complete Subtree method and it reduces the number of keys a receiver stores to one. There have been proposed some methods which minimize the number of keys for a receiver to one. The most efficient one among them uses RSA cryptosystem in order to reduce the number of keys, while the proposed method is based on Rabin cryptosystem. The computational overhead at receivers in our method is around 1 / log2 e compared with the most efficient method proposed previously, where e is a public exponent of RSA. We examine this result by experiments. Therefore, the proposed method is the most efficient among tree based one-key methods with respect to the computational overhead at receivers. This reduction in the computational overhead is achieved in exchange for an increase in the size of nonsecret memory by [ log N * few (e. g. eight)] bits, where N is the total number of receivers. The security of the proposed method is equivalent to Rabin cryptosystem in the sense of key-intractability in the random oracle model.

Keywords

Hash Function Computational Overhead Secret Information Digital Right Management Random Oracle Model 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tomoyuki Asano
    • 1
  • Kazuya Kamio
    • 1
  1. 1.Sony CorporationTokyoJapan

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