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Counting Abuses Using Flexible Off-line Credentials

  • Kemal Bicakci
  • Bruno Crispo
  • Andrew S. Tanenbaum
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3574)

Abstract

Mobile and ad-hoc networks allow businesses to provide a new range of applications and services and at the same time they introduce new constraints that have important effects on the way in which security primitives must be designed. This is challenging because it translates to a demand of richer and more flexible security primitives that often need to satisfy stricter requirements than traditional wired network scenarios. In this paper we focus on one of this primitive, namely security credentials. We present a solution that extends the existing protocols used to implement off-line credentials such that, not only abuses can be detected but they can also be counted. Our solution addresses the problem of 1-time and 2-times credentials and we will conclude by discussing the challenges that need to be solved to generalize the primitive to k=n.

Keywords

Random Number Credit Card Blind Signature Hash Image Security Credential 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kemal Bicakci
    • 1
  • Bruno Crispo
    • 1
  • Andrew S. Tanenbaum
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceVrije UniversiteitAmsterdamThe Netherlands

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