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A Strategy-Proof Mechanism Based on Multiple Auction Support Agents

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Innovations in Applied Artificial Intelligence (IEA/AIE 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 3533))

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Abstract

Agent-mediated electronic commerce has recently commanded much attention. Bidding support agents have been studied very extensively. We envision a future in which many people can trade their goods by using a bidding support agent on Internet auctions. In this paper, we formalize a situation in which people are trading their goods on Internet auctions and employing bidding support agents. Then, we prove that people who use a bidding support agent can successively win trades. Also, we prove that the situation in which every people use a bidding support agent can satisfied strategy proofness and Pareto optimality. Further, we present in the situation, unsupported bidders do not make a positive benefit.

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Ito, T., Matsuo, T., Ozono, T., Shintani, T. (2005). A Strategy-Proof Mechanism Based on Multiple Auction Support Agents. In: Ali, M., Esposito, F. (eds) Innovations in Applied Artificial Intelligence. IEA/AIE 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3533. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11504894_25

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11504894_25

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-26551-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31893-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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