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On Subliminal Channels in Deterministic Signature Schemes

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 3506))

Abstract

Subliminal channels in randomized signature algorithms like the DSA are well-known. However, much less seems to be known about this issue when dealing with deterministic schemes. Using some known signature schemes like ESIGN-D and SFLASHv3 as example, we illustrate the problem of subliminal channels in non-interactive deterministic signature algorithms. Based on anappropriate formalization, a deterministic variant of RSA-PSS is shown to be subliminal free.

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Bohli, JM., Steinwandt, R. (2005). On Subliminal Channels in Deterministic Signature Schemes. In: Park, Cs., Chee, S. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology – ICISC 2004. ICISC 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3506. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11496618_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11496618_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-26226-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32083-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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