Παιδíα Παíζει The Interaction Between Algorithms and Game Theory

  • Christos H. Papadimitriou
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3503)


The theories of algorithms and games were arguably born within a year of each other, in the wake of two quite distinct breakthroughs by John von Neumann, in the former case to investigate the great opportunities – as well as the ever mysterious obstacles – in attacking problems by computers, in the latter to model and study rational selfish behavior in the context of interaction, competition and cooperation. For more than half a century the two fields advanced as gloriously as they did separately. There was, of course, a tradition of computational considerations in equilibria initiated by Scarf [13], work on computing Nash and other equilibria [6,7], and reciprocal isolated works by algorithms researchers [8], as well as two important points of contact between the two fields à propos the issues of repeated games and bounded rationality [15] and learning in games [2]. But the current intensive interaction and cross-fertilization between the two disciplines, and the creation of a solid and growing body of work at their interface, must be seen as a direct consequence of the Internet.


Nash Equilibrium Game Theory Competitive Ratio Repeated Game Central Design 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christos H. Papadimitriou
    • 1
  1. 1.UC Berkeley 

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