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The Role and the Impact of Preferences on Multiagent Interaction

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Intelligent Agents VI. Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages (ATAL 1999)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 1757))

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Abstract

In the paper we extend our previous analysis of the implications and conditions for employing prosocial and antisocial agents in multiagent interaction. We consider social preferences to be individual preferences that take into account other agents’ preferences. Social preferences can be pro-social and antisocial. We analyze altruistic and envious agents as two generic types of pro-social and antisocial agents. We show that declaring pro- social preferences is not sufficient for obtaining desirable social outcomes. Since every particular situation includes different agents with different preferences, a conflict of preferences could occur even if all agents are pro-social. We provide sufficient conditions for preference consistency in multiagent plans. By consistent preferences we mean preferences that are consistent between agents and consistent for every agent. A negotiation game between different types of agents is analyzed. It is shown that different preferences give rise to different types of strategic behavior.

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Brainov, S. (2000). The Role and the Impact of Preferences on Multiagent Interaction. In: Jennings, N.R., Lespérance, Y. (eds) Intelligent Agents VI. Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages. ATAL 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 1757. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/10719619_26

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/10719619_26

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-67200-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-46467-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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