Abstract
In the paper we extend our previous analysis of the implications and conditions for employing prosocial and antisocial agents in multiagent interaction. We consider social preferences to be individual preferences that take into account other agents’ preferences. Social preferences can be pro-social and antisocial. We analyze altruistic and envious agents as two generic types of pro-social and antisocial agents. We show that declaring pro- social preferences is not sufficient for obtaining desirable social outcomes. Since every particular situation includes different agents with different preferences, a conflict of preferences could occur even if all agents are pro-social. We provide sufficient conditions for preference consistency in multiagent plans. By consistent preferences we mean preferences that are consistent between agents and consistent for every agent. A negotiation game between different types of agents is analyzed. It is shown that different preferences give rise to different types of strategic behavior.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Boella, G., Damiano, R., Lesmo, L.: Cooperating to the Group Utility. In: Jennings, N.R., Lespérance, Y. (eds.) ATAL 1999. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 1757, pp. 319–333. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Brainov, S.: Altruistic Cooperation Between Self-Interested Agents. In: Proceedings of the European Conference of Artificial Intelligence, pp. 519–523 (1996)
Brainov, S.: Models of Stable Cooperation in Multiagent Systems. Ph.D. Thesis. Computer Center of Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow (1998)
Brainov, S., Sandholm, T.: Power, Dependence and Stability in Multiagent Plans. In: Proceedings of AAAI 1999, Orlando, pp. 11–16 (1999)
Castelfranchi, C., Conte, R.: Limits of Economic and Strategic Rationality for Agents and MA Systems. Robotics and Autonomous Agents 24(3-4), 127–139 (1998)
Castelfranchi, C., Dignum, F., Jinker, C., Treur, J.: Deliberate Normative Agents: Principles and Architecture. In: Jennings, N.R. (ed.) ATAL 1999. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 1757, pp. 364–378. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Cesta, A., Miceli, M., Rizzo, P.: Helping Under Risky Conditions: Robustness of the Social Attitude and System Performance. In: Proceedings of ICMAS 1996, pp. 18–25 (1996)
Fishburn, P.: Utility Theory for Decision Making. John Wiley, Chichester (1970)
Fishbern, P.: Nonlinear Preference and Utility Theory. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore (1988)
Hogg, L., Jennings, N.: Variable Sociability in Agent-Based Decision Making. In: Jennings, N.R. (ed.) ATAL 1999. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 1757, pp. 305–318. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Jennings, N., Campos, J.: Towards a Social Level Characterization of Socially Responsible Agents. IEEE Proceedings on Software Engineering 144(1), 11–25 (1997)
Moulin, H.: Axioms of Cooperative Decision making. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1988)
Nash, J.: The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18, 155–162 (1950)
Roberts, F.: Measurement Theory. In: Encyclopedia of Mathematics, vol. 7. Addison-Wesley, Reading (1979)
Sen, S.: Reciprocity: A Foundational Principle for Promoting Cooperative Behavior Among Self-Interested Agents. In: Proceedings of ICMAS 1996, pp. 322–329 (1996)
Tversky, A., Kahneman, D.: Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions. In: Hogarth, R., Reder, W. (eds.) Rational Choice, pp. 67–94. Chicago University Press (1986)
Wagner, T., Lesser, V.: Relating Quantified Motivatrions for Organizationally Situated Agents. In: Jennings, N.R. (ed.) ATAL 1999. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 1757, pp. 334–348. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2000 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Brainov, S. (2000). The Role and the Impact of Preferences on Multiagent Interaction. In: Jennings, N.R., Lespérance, Y. (eds) Intelligent Agents VI. Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages. ATAL 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 1757. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/10719619_26
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/10719619_26
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-67200-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-46467-9
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive