Abstract
Camellia is the final selection of 128-bit block cipher in NESSIE. In this paper, we present differential-linear cryptanalysis of modified camellia reduced to 9 and 10 rounds. For modified camellia with 9 rounds we can find the user key with 214 chosen plaintexts and 2185.5 encryptions and for modified camellia with 10 rounds we can find the user key with 214 chosen plaintexts and 2245.6 encryptions.
This work was supported by Chinese Natural Science Foundation (Grant No. 60373047) and 863 Project (Grant No. 2003AA14403)
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© 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Wu, W., Feng, D. (2004). Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis of Camellia. In: Chen, K. (eds) Progress on Cryptography. The International Series in Engineering and Computer Science, vol 769. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-7987-7_24
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-7987-7_24
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
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