Abstract
This chapter starts by reviewing various arguments about the possible inter-temporal shifting of the burden of public debt. Within a democratic polity, it is misleading to speak of the state as being indebted, even though the historical record presents us with many instances of indebted monarchs. A democratic state is rather in the position of a financial intermediary, though the relationships among debtors and creditors are governed by political and not market institutions. Under prevailing monetary institutions, moreover, public debt is integrated into contemporary arrangements concerning money and credit.
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Wagner, R.E. (2005). Debt, Money, and Public Finance. In: Backhaus, J.G., Wagner, R.E. (eds) Handbook of Public Finance. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-7864-1_8
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