Abstract
A mainly European and continental notion, subsidiarity is nevertheless at the heart of federalism. Either in an international context or in order to federate a nation, the economics of constitutions provides a nuanced view of the merits of the different forms of federalism. It builds on the tools of economic analysis to try to draw some lessons from the American experience that could serve to better understand the ongoing institutional changes in Europe.
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Josselin, JM., Marciano, A. (2005). Federalism and Subsidiarity in National and International Contexts. In: Backhaus, J.G., Wagner, R.E. (eds) Handbook of Public Finance. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-7864-1_17
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