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Federalism and Subsidiarity in National and International Contexts

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Abstract

A mainly European and continental notion, subsidiarity is nevertheless at the heart of federalism. Either in an international context or in order to federate a nation, the economics of constitutions provides a nuanced view of the merits of the different forms of federalism. It builds on the tools of economic analysis to try to draw some lessons from the American experience that could serve to better understand the ongoing institutional changes in Europe.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Université de Rennes 1 and Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Rennes, France

    Jean-Michel Josselin

  2. Université de Reims Champagne Ardenne and Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (GREQAM) and IDEP, Reims, France

    Alain Marciano

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  1. Jean-Michel Josselin
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  2. Alain Marciano
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany

    Jürgen G. Backhaus

  2. George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, USA

    Richard E. Wagner

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Josselin, JM., Marciano, A. (2005). Federalism and Subsidiarity in National and International Contexts. In: Backhaus, J.G., Wagner, R.E. (eds) Handbook of Public Finance. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-7864-1_17

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