Abstract
The distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification, this distinction dear to the projects of logical empiricism, was, as is well known, introduced in precisely those terms by Hans Reichenbach in his Experience and Prediction (Reichenbach 1938). Thus, while the idea behind the distinction has a long history before Reichenbach, this text from 1938 plays a salient role in how the distinction became canonical in the work of philosophers of science in the mid twentieth century. The new contextualist history of philosophy that has arisen in recent years invites us into an investigation of the nuances of philosophical distinctions and their roles in shaping the development of disciplines. Logical empiricism played a key role in the historical development of philosophy of science and this contextualist history has revealed a much richer set of projects in logical empiricism than the potted histories had allowed. Many stories have been told about the contexts of justification and discovery; few of those stories have paid more than passing attention to the larger projects in epistemology and meta-epistemology that Reichenbach was pursuing when he drew the distinction.
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RICHARDSON, A. (2006). FREEDOM IN A SCIENTIFIC SOCIETY: READING THE CONTEXT OF REICHENBACH’S CONTEXTS. In: SCHICKORE, J., STEINLE, F. (eds) Revisiting Discovery and Justification. Archimedes, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-4251-5_4
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