Skip to main content

INTRODUCTION: REVISITING THE CONTEXT DISTINCTION

  • Chapter

Part of the book series: Archimedes ((ARIM,volume 14))

The distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification has had a turbulent career in philosophy of science. At times celebrated as the hallmark of philosophical approaches to science, at times condemned as ambiguous, distorting, and misleading, the distinction dominated philosophical debates from the early decades of the twentieth century to the 1980s. In recent years, the distinction has vanished from philosophers’ official agenda. However, even though it is rarely explicitly addressed, it still informs our conception of the content, domain, and goals of philosophy of science. The fact that new developments in philosophy of experimentation and history and sociology of science have been marginalized by traditional scholarship in philosophy indicates that the context distinction still pervades philosophical thinking about science. This volume helps clear the grounds for the productive and fruitful integration of these new developments into philosophy of science.We identify several focal points for the re-assessment of the distinction: the original contexts, especially the work of the Logical Empiricists, its alleged forerunners in the nineteenth century, and its evolution and dissemination throughout the twentieth century.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

REFERENCES

  • Ankeny, R. (2000), “Fashioning Descriptive Models in Biology: Of Worms and Wiring Diagrams,” Philosophy of Science 67 (supplement): S260–S272.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baird, Davis (2004), Thing Knowledge: A Philosophy of Scientific Instruments (Berkeley: University of California Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Bechtel, William (1994), “Deciding on the Data: Epistemological Problems Surrounding Instruments and Research Techniques in Cell Biology,” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 167–178.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bechtel, William and Robert Richardson (1993), Discovering Complexity (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Benschop, Ruth and Douwe Draaisma (2000), “In Pursuit of Precision. The Calibration of Minds and Machines in Late Nineteenth-Century Psychology,” Annals of Science 57: 1–25.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bresadola, Marco (2003), “At Play With Nature: Luigi Galvani's Experimental Approach to Muscular Physiology”, in F. L. Holmes et al. (eds.), Reworking the Bench: Research Notebooks in the History of Science (Dordrecht, Boston and London: Kluwer), pp. 67–92.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, B. G. (1985), “Steps Toward Mechanizing Discovery”, in K. Schaffner (ed.), Logic of Discovery and Diagnosis in Medicine (Berkeley: University of California Press), pp. 94–114.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchwald, Jed Z. (ed.) (1995). Scientific Practice. Theories and Stories of Doing Physics (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Burian, Richard M. (1977), “More Than a Marriage of Convenience: On the Inextricability of History and Philosophy of Science,” Philosophy of Science 44: 1–42.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cartwright, Nancy, Jordi Cat et al. (1996), Otto Neurath: Philosophy Between Science and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Chalmers, Alan (2003), “The Theory-Dependence of the Use of Instruments in Science,” Philosophy of Science 70: 493–509.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Collins, Harry (1985), Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice (London: Sage).

    Google Scholar 

  • Cooter, Roger (1984), The Cultural Meaning of Popular Science: Phrenology and the Organization of Consent in Nineteenth Century Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Craver, Carl F. (2001), “Role Functions, Mechanisms, and Hierarchy,” Philosophy of Science 68: 53–74.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Creager, Angela (2002), The Life of a Virus: Tobacco Mosaic Virus as an Experimental Model, 1930–1965 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Culp, Sylvia (1995), “Objectivity in Experimental Inquiry: Breaking the Data-Technique Circles,” Philosophy of Science 62: 430–150.

    Google Scholar 

  • Darden, Lindley (1990), “Diagnosing and Fixing Faults in Theories”, in J. Shrager and P. Langley (eds.), Computational Models of Scientific Discovery andTheory Formation (SanMateo: Morgan Kaufman), pp. 319–346.

    Google Scholar 

  • Darden, Lindley (1991), Theory Change in Science: Strategies from Mendelian Genetics (New York: Oxford University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Darden, Lindley (1996), “Essay Review. Generalizations in Biology,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 27: 409–419.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Darden, Lindley (1997), “Recent Work in Computational Scientific Discovery”, in M. Shafto and P. W. Langley (eds.), Proceedings of the Nineteenth Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum), pp. 161–166.

    Google Scholar 

  • Darden, Lindley (1998). Discovery, Evaluation, Revision: Cycles in Scientific Change (abstract). International Congress on Discovery and Creativity, Ghent.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dror, Otniel E. (1999), “The Scientific Image of Emotion: Experience and Technologies of Inscription,” Configurations 7: 355–401.

    Google Scholar 

  • Elliot, Kevin (2004), “Error as Means to Discovery,” Philosophy of Science 71: 1–24.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feigenbaum, E. A., B. G. Buchanan et al. (1971), “On Generality and Problem Solving: A Case Study Using the DENDRAL Program,” Machine Intelligence 6: 165–190.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feigl, Herbert (1970), “Beyond Peaceful Coexistence”, in R. H. Stuewer (ed.), Historical and Philosophical Perspectives of Science (New York et al.: Gordon and Breach), pp. 3–11.

    Google Scholar 

  • Franklin, Allan (1986), The Neglect of Experiment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Franklin, Allan (1994), “How to Avoid the Experimenters’ Regress,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 25: 463–491.

    Google Scholar 

  • Franklin, Allan (1999), Can That Be Right? (Dordrecht, Boston and London: Kluwer).

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman, Michael (1999), Reconsidering Logical Positivism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Gaudillière, Jean-Paul (2001), “Mapping as Technology: Genes, Mutant Mice, and Biomedical Research, 1910–1965”, in B. Joerges and T. Shinn (eds.), Instrumentation. Between Science, State and Industry, Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook XXII (Dordrecht: Kluwer), pp. 29–48.

    Google Scholar 

  • Giere, Ronald (1973), “History and Philosophy of Science: Intimate Relationship or Marriage of Convenience?,” British Journal for Philosophy of Science 24: 282–297.

    Google Scholar 

  • Giere, Ronald N. and Alan W. Richardson (1996), Origins of Logical Empiricism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Gieryn, Thomas F. (1999), Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Glennan, Stuart (1996), “Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation,” Erkenntnis 44: 49–71.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Golinski, Jan (1992), Science as Public Culture. Chemistry and Enlightenment in Britain, 1760–1820 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Gooding, David (1990), Experiment and the Making of Meaning (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers).

    Google Scholar 

  • Gooding, David, Trevor Pinch et al. (eds.) (1989), The Uses of Experiment. Studies in the Natural Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Grasshoff, Gerd, R. Casties et al. (2000), Zur Theorie des Experimentes. Untersuchungen am Beispiel der Entdeckung des Harnstoffzyklus (Bern: Bern Studies for the History and Philosophy of Science).

    Google Scholar 

  • Graßhoff, Gerd and Michael May (1995), “Methodische Analyse wissenschaftlichen Entdeckens,” Kognitionswissenschaft 5: 51–67.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hacking, Ian (1983), Representing and Intervening (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Hacking, Ian (1990), The Taming of Chance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Hacking, Ian (1995), Rewriting the Soul. Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Hacking, Ian (1999), “Historical Meta-Epistemology”, in W. Carl and L. Daston (eds.), Wahrheit und Geschichte (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht), pp. 53–77.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hankins, Thomas L. and Robert J. Silverman (1995), Instruments and the Imagination (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Hanson, Norwood Russell (1958), Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Harwood, William S. (2004), “A New Model for Inquiry. Is the Scientific Method Dead?,” Journal of College Science Teaching 33.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heidelberger, Michael and Friedrich Steinle (eds.) (1998), Experimental Essays-Versuche über das Experiment (Baden-Baden: Nomos).

    Google Scholar 

  • Hoyningen-Huene, Paul (1987), “Context of Discovery and Context of Justification,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 18: 501–515.

    Google Scholar 

  • Joerges, Bernward and Terry Shinn (eds.) (2001), Instrumentation. Between Science, State and Industry (Dordrecht: Kluwer).

    Google Scholar 

  • Kitcher, Philip (2001), Science, Truth, and Democracy (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Knorr-Cetina, Karin (1981), The Manufacture of Knowledge (Oxford: Pergamon Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Kordig, Carl (1978), “Discovery and Justification,” Philosophy of Science 45: 110–117.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krüger, Lorenz (1979), History and Philosophy of Science—A Marriage for the Sake of Reason. Abstracts 6: 6th International Congress for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science (Hannover: Dr. Bönecke), pp. 108–112.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962), “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”, in O. Neurath et al. (eds.), Encyclopedia of Unified Science, vol. I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Lakatos, Imre (1970), “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes”, in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (London: Cambridge University Press), pp. 91–195.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lakatos, Imre and Alan Musgrave (eds.) (1970), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Langley, P., Herbert A. Simon et al. (1987), Scientific Discovery: Computational Explorations of the Creative Processes (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Laudan, Larry (1977), Progress and its Problems (Berkeley: University of California Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Laudan, Larry (1980), “Why Was the Logic of Discovery Abandoned?”, in T. Nickles (ed.), Scientific Discovery, vol. I (Dordrecht: Reidel), pp. 173–183.

    Google Scholar 

  • Longino, Helen E. (2002), The Fate of Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Losee, John (1979), A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Machamer, Peter, Lindley Darden et al. (2000), “Thinking About Mechanisms,” Philosophy of Science 67: 1–25.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayo, Deborah G. (2000), “Experimental Practice and an Error Statistical Account of Evidence,” Philosophy of Science. Supplement 67: S193–S207.

    Google Scholar 

  • McLaughlin, Robert (1982), “Invention and Induction. Laudan, Simon and the Logic of Discovery,” Philosophy of Science 49: 198–211.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McMullin, Ernan (1990), “The Development of Philosophy of Science 1600–1900”, in R. C. Olby et al. (eds.), Companion to the History of Modern Science (London and New York), pp. 816–837.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morus, Iwan Rhys (1998), Frankenstein’s Children: Electricity, Exhibition, and Experiment in Early-Nineteenth-Century London (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Nersessian, Nancy J. (1995), “Opening the Black Box: Cognitive Science and History of Science,” Osiris: A Research Journal Devoted to the History of Science and its Cultural Influences 10: 194–211.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nickles, Thomas (1980a), “Introductory Essay: Scientific Discovery and the Future of Philosophy of Science”, in T. Nickles (ed.), Scientific Discovery, Logic, and Rationality (Dordrecht: Reidel), pp. 1–59.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nickles, Thomas (ed.) (1980b), Scientific Discovery, Logic, and Rationality (Dordrecht: Reidel).

    Google Scholar 

  • Nickles, Thomas (1985), “Beyond Divorce: Current Status of the Discovery Debate,” Philosophy of Science 52: 177–206.

    Google Scholar 

  • Radder, Hans (2003), “Toward a More Developed Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation”, in H. Radder (ed.), Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press), pp. 1–18.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rader, Karen (1999), “Of Mice, Medicine, and Genetics: CC Little’s Creation of the Inbred Laboratory Mouse, 1909–1918,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biology and Biomedical Sciences 30: 319.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rasmussen, Nicolas (1993), “Facts, Artifacts, and Mesosomes: Practicing Epistemology with the Electron Microscope,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 24: 227–265.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Reichenbach, Hans (1938), Experience and Prediction. An Analysis of the Foundations and the Structure of Knowledge (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Rheinberger, Hans-Jörg (1997), Toward a History of Epistemic Things (Stanford: Stanford University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Rudge, David Wyss (2001), “Kettlewell from an Error Statistician’s Point of View,” Perspectives on Science 9: 59–77.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Salmon, Wesley C. (1970), “Bayes's Theorem and the History of Science”, in R. H. Stuewer (ed.), Historical and Philosophical Perspectives of Science (New York et al.: Gordon and Breach), pp. 68–86.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schaffer, Simon (1986), “Scientific Discoveries and the End of Natural Philosophy,” Social Studies of Science 16: 387–120.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schaffner, Kenneth (1980), “Discovery in the Biomedical Sciences: Logic or Irrational Intuition?”, in T. Nickles (ed.), Scientific Discovery: Case Studies, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 60 (Dordrecht: Reidel), pp. 171–205.

    Google Scholar 

  • Simon, Herbert A and D. Kulkarni (1988), “The Process of Scientific Discovery: The Strategy of Experimentation,” Cognitive Science 12: 139–175.

    Google Scholar 

  • Simon, Herbert A. (1973), “Does Scientific Discovery Have a Logic?,” Philosophy of Science 40: 471–480.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Simon, Herbert A., Patrick W. Langley et al. (1981), “Scientific Discovery as Problem Solving,” Synthese 47: 1–28.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stadler, Friedrich (1997), Studien zum Wiener Kreis (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp).

    Google Scholar 

  • Steinle, Friedrich (2005), Explorative Experimente. Ampére, Faraday und die Urspriinge der Elektro-dynamik. Boethius 50. (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag).

    Google Scholar 

  • Steinle, Friedrich and Richard M. Burian (2003), “Special Issue: History of Science and Philosophy of Science,” Perspectives on Science 10.

    Google Scholar 

  • Uebel, Thomas E. (ed.) (1991), Rediscovering the Forgotten Vienna Circle. Austrian Studies on Otto Neurath and the Vienna Circle (Dordrecht, Boston and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers).

    Google Scholar 

  • Weber, Marcel (2005), Philosophy of Experimental Biology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Winter, Alison (1998), Mesmerized: Powers of Mind in Victorian Britain (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Yeo, Richard (1993), Defining Science. William Whewell, Natural Knowledge, and Public Debate in Early Victorian Britai (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2006 Springer

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

SCHICKORE, J., STEINLE, F. (2006). INTRODUCTION: REVISITING THE CONTEXT DISTINCTION. In: SCHICKORE, J., STEINLE, F. (eds) Revisiting Discovery and Justification. Archimedes, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-4251-5_1

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics